

**CHICKAMAUGA  
STAFF RIDE  
BRIEFING BOOK**



**OFFICE OF ARMY RESERVE HISTORY**

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UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE STAFF RIDE BRIEFING BOOK SERIES

# CHICKAMAUGA STAFF RIDE BRIEFING BOOK

Edward P. Shanahan



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## **United States Army Reserve Staff Ride Briefing Book Series**

The Office of Army Reserve History produces staff ride briefing books to provide a systematic approach to the analysis of significant campaigns and battles in the history of the military art and the profession of arms. These handbooks supplement various essential training activities of unit leader development programs, military history readiness exercises, and military history education programs as required by Army regulation. Specifically, the immediate goal of the staff ride methodology is to make the professional development experience of military leaders more meaningful, by stimulating the process of historical inquiry, analysis, and application. The ultimate goal of this publication is to help develop and sustain a historically minded officer and noncommissioned officer corps in the Army Reserve capable of applying a historical perspective to the resolution of contemporary military problems, and, in turn, to support the reserve component's mission of readiness for war.



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## FOREWORD

This volume is the first in a series of staff ride handbooks for use by Army Reservists in examining and assessing military operations of the past in order to be ready for the military challenges of the future. The study of battlefields such as Chickamauga offers unique insights into the complexities of leadership and men in battle, in both the combat and the combat support/service support roles. A careful analysis of military operations on the actual terrain of the action will allow today's citizen soldiers to appreciate the conditions experienced by their predecessors at the time, gaining a better understanding of timeless lessons and principles of war. Such historical mindedness can go far in shaping the military leadership style necessary on the battlefields of the twenty-first century.

Production of the *Chickamauga Staff Ride Briefing Book* resulted from the cooperative efforts of the entire staff in the Office of Army Reserve History. Supervision of the compilation effort was handled by Mr. Ed Shanahan, staff historian and co-author of the Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College publication *Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga, 18-20 September 1863* -- from which some of the narrative and organizational charts were extracted. Dr. Kathryn Roe Coker, research historian, reviewed the narrative and provided important recommendations for revisions. Mr. Shanahan and the undersigned created the campaign and battle maps, figures 2 through 16 on a Wang 1414-LR computer using Power Point. Layout, word processing, camera ready production, and a wide range of other editorial assistance were skillfully accomplished by Ms. Doris Harvey, historian assistant, and Mrs. Donna Murphy, secretary. The overall direction and editing of the publication was the responsibility of the undersigned.

Fort McPherson  
Atlanta, Georgia  
October 2003

LEE S. HARFORD, JR., Ph.D.  
Army Reserve Historian  
US Army Reserve Command

# CHICKAMAUGA STAFF RIDE BRIEFING BOOK

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
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## CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN OVERVIEW

The Chickamauga campaign took place in the summer and fall of 1863 -- a period of catastrophic Confederate defeats in the eastern and western theaters of the Civil War. In July, Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia suffered 25,000 casualties and turned back from its second invasion of the North after the Battle of Gettysburg. Never again would that Southern army seriously threaten Northern territory. Also in July, John C. Pemberton's Army of Mississippi surrendered 30,000 men at Vicksburg. Thus, in mid-1863, middle Tennessee was the only theater in which the Confederacy had not suffered a major reversal. The last Confederate army of real significance, General Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee defended middle Tennessee and Chattanooga against Major General William S. Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland. They faced each other near Murfreesboro, where they had fought a great battle at the end of 1862.



Although western Tennessee had fallen to the Union in early 1862, much of middle and eastern Tennessee remained under Confederate control in the summer of 1863. The area was important to both sides for many reasons. President Abraham Lincoln was particularly interested

(Portions of the narrative and figures 17-19 extracted from Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga, 18-20 September 1863, by Glenn Robertson, Ed Shanahan, John Boxberger, and George Knapp, USACGSC.)



in liberating eastern Tennessee because so many loyal Unionists lived there. The most direct rail connection between Virginia and the western part of the Confederacy also passed through Knoxville. In the apportionment of commissary resources, Confederate armies in the east depended on this region for subsistence. Middle and eastern Tennessee contributed essential pork and corn to the Confederate commissary, as well as copper and saltpeter for percussion caps and gunpowder.

Chattanooga was an important military objective for the North because of its position as a gateway through the Appalachian Mountains into the South's heartland. A city of approximately 2,500 people, it was a central rail junction. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad ran west to the Mississippi River. The Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad entered Chattanooga from middle Tennessee. The Western and Atlantic Railroad ran to the southeast toward Atlanta. To the northeast ran the East Tennessee Railroad to Knoxville, Bristol, and Lynchburg, Virginia, with connections to Richmond. Furthermore, the South had valuable commissary, quartermaster, and ordnance depots in Chattanooga. Also, several Confederate hospitals were located in and near the city. The rail connection through Atlanta linked Chattanooga with munitions and iron production centers in Georgia and Alabama. Most important, Chattanooga was a key place from which the Union could sustain a further advance on its next objective -- Atlanta.

The terrain between Murfreesboro and Chattanooga offered many challenges to armies attempting to traverse it or conduct operations there. Approximately twenty miles southeast of Murfreesboro lay a range of hills, almost mountainous in height, broken by several defiles -- Hoover's, Liberty, Bellbuckle, and Guy's Gaps. Through these gaps ran several roads as well as the railroad between Nashville and Chattanooga. Behind the hills about forty miles southeast of Murfreesboro lay the Duck River, a deep, narrow stream with few fords. Beyond the Duck, the country was rough, with rocky ranges of hills rising to a high, rolling plateau called "the barrens". The porous topsoil of that desolate area barely covered a layer of clay that temporarily held rain, creating massive quagmires after a storm. Fifteen miles beyond the Duck River, another stream, the Elk River, flowed westward out of "the barrens". In turn, "the barrens" gave way to the range of mountains known as the Cumberland Plateau. The Tullahoma campaign, a preliminary phase of the Chickamauga campaign, would occur in the area between Murfreesboro and the Cumberland Plateau. (See Figure 2, page 3)

East of the high plateaus and gorges of the Cumberland Mountains, and generally parallel to them, lay the broad Tennessee River. Rising in east Tennessee and flowing generally southwest until it entered northeast Alabama, the Tennessee cut through the mountains west of Chattanooga in a canyon of massive proportions. South of the river, the land rose sharply to the Sand and Raccoon Mountains, then dropped almost as sharply into the valley of Lookout Creek before rising again to Lookout Mountain, the largest of the ridges that slant southwest across the Tennessee-Georgia-Alabama border. The northern end of Lookout Mountain was crossed by only three significant roads in 1863. The main road west from Chattanooga followed the Tennessee River valley along a narrow shelf under the northern promontory of the mountain where the river swept around Moccasin Bend. The next crossing was fourteen miles southwest of Chattanooga at Stevens Gap. Last was a rough road over the mountain more than twenty miles farther south at Winston's Gap in Alabama. Beyond Lookout Mountain lay Missionary



Ridge, which guarded Chattanooga's eastern flank. East of Missionary Ridge, several branches of Chickamauga Creek watered a series of valleys between gently rolling hills. After a three-week campaign beginning on the banks of the Tennessee River and traversing two mountain barriers, the two armies found themselves confronting each other on opposite sides of West Chickamauga Creek.




FIGURE 2: Tullahoma Campaign, 24 June to 4 July 1863

By the summer of 1863, the Union drive to secure Tennessee had stalled. Union armies had done well in western Tennessee, beginning in early 1862 in the Fort Henry and Fort Donelson campaign that led to the capture of Nashville -- the first Confederate state capital taken in the war. Thereafter, Union forces had used the Tennessee River to move deeper into Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, but the Confederacy had countered with offensives of its own. This ebb and flow resulted in a stalemate in middle Tennessee, following the Battle of Stones River in January 1863. After that bloody battle, Bragg withdrew to the Duck River and assumed the defensive. He put one corps at Shelbyville and another at Wartrace, both in strong positions. His cavalry screened both flanks, and infantry controlled the four mountain gaps to his north through which he expected the Union Army to advance. Rosecrans occupied Murfreesboro and seemed content to remain there in spite of repeated urging by the Lincoln administration to move forward.

Both Rosecrans and Bragg thought their positions inferior. Rosecrans had about 80,000 men to Bragg's 50,000, but as much as 20 percent of the Union Army had to guard supply lines against Confederate raids. Rosecrans's cavalry force was weak, and he used this argument repeatedly in delaying his advance. Bragg's most pressing problems were that Vicksburg had priority in the west for troops and Lee's army in the east drew much of its subsistence from the region in which Bragg's army operated. Bragg had to detach troops from his army to aid Vicksburg, and this eliminated, at least in his mind, the idea that he should take the offensive against Rosecrans. Fortunately for Bragg, Rosecrans declined to advance. Soon, events in the east and west concluded with Confederate defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Both sides shifted their focus to middle Tennessee.

Under severe pressure from Washington, Rosecrans finally moved forward on 24 June 1863. He used his cavalry and reserve infantry corps as a diversion toward Shelbyville, then moved with his main body to turn the Confederate right flank between Wartrace and Manchester. Despite a pouring rain, bottomless roads, and some small fights for the gaps through rough country south of Murfreesboro, Rosecrans successfully outflanked the Confederates, and Bragg withdrew to Tullahoma after less than a week of maneuver. Rosecrans next sought to cross the Elk River and seize control of Bragg's supply line. Again, Bragg narrowly escaped the trap and withdrew all the way to Chattanooga, which he occupied on 4 July. In nine days of skillful maneuvering, Rosecrans forced Bragg out of Tennessee at a cost of less than 600 casualties. This brilliant and relatively bloodless operation is known as the Tullahoma campaign.

In early July, Rosecrans halted the Army of the Cumberland along the Fayetteville-Decherd-Manchester-McMinnville line, in sight of the formidable barrier of the Cumberland Mountains. In preparation for further advances, he sent Major General Philip H. Sheridan's division beyond the Cumberland Plateau to Stevenson, Alabama, and worked to repair the railroad from that point back to Murfreesboro. Unsatisfied, the War Department again demanded that Rosecrans advance. In response, on 16 August, after six weeks of preparation and rest, Rosecrans sent the Army of the Cumberland over the Cumberland Mountains toward the Tennessee River on a broad front. In less than a week, his army closed to the river with corps-size forces near Stevenson and Bridgeport, Alabama, and Shellmound, Tennessee. The next forward movement would take the Federals across the Tennessee River, where Bragg's veterans waited.






FIGURE 3: Chickamauga Campaign, 29 August to 20 September 1863

When Rosecrans pushed the Army of the Cumberland across the wide Tennessee River in early September 1863, his primary goal was to capture Chattanooga, Tennessee. Delaying his final advance until the end of the summer when the corn ripened and the railroad from Nashville was repaired, in late August, he mounted a masterful deception operation to mislead the Confederate defenders. While four brigades demonstrated opposite Chattanooga and upstream, the bulk of the Army of the Cumberland quietly gathered at four crossing sites far below the city shielded by

Sand and Lookout Mountains. Bragg, who had kept his infantry force concentrated near Chattanooga, was badly served by Major General Joseph Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, which screened the river line below Chattanooga. Concentrating on resting and refitting after the arduous Tullahoma campaign, Wheeler and his men were mainly located far back from the river and did not contest any of the crossings. Nor did they provide Bragg with timely information of Federal activity. Blinded by a belief that Rosecrans would have to cross the Tennessee River north of Chattanooga in order to support Major General Ambrose E. Burnside's force in east Tennessee, Bragg and his principal subordinates eventually learned of the Federal crossings from a civilian. (See Figure 3, page 5)

In early September, Rosecrans divided his army into three segments and began a wide-front advance that he hoped would flank Bragg's army out of Chattanooga without a major battle. Major General Thomas L. Crittenden's XXI Corps advanced directly toward Chattanooga along the railroad that passed through a canyon in Sand Mountain. Major General George H. Thomas' XIV Corps crossed Sand and Lookout Mountains and entered McLemore's Cove en route to LaFayette, Georgia. Major General Alexander M. McCook's XX Corps followed Major General David S. Stanley's Cavalry Corps across Sand and Lookout Mountains to the vicinity of Alpine, Georgia. Although the columns were not within mutual supporting distance because of the mountainous terrain, Rosecrans believed the threat posed to Bragg's line of communication by Thomas, McCook, and Stanley would force the evacuation of Chattanooga.

As Rosecrans expected, Bragg evacuated Chattanooga on 8 September. Rather than retreat beyond the mountains along the railroad to his base at Atlanta, however, Bragg elected to keep his army concentrated near LaFayette, Georgia. There, shielded by Pigeon Mountain, a spur of Lookout, the Army of Tennessee could await the arrival of reinforcements and seize any opportunity to defeat the scattered elements of the Army of the Cumberland in detail. Joined by Major General Simon B. Buckner's forces from east Tennessee, Bragg felt confident enough to strike the leading division (Negley's 2d) of Thomas' XIV Corps with overwhelming force in McLemore's Cove. Unfortunately for Bragg, the leaders of the expedition, LTG D. H. Hill and MG Thomas C. Hindman, took counsel of their fears and dallied for two days without making a serious attack.

McLemore's Cove was a turning point, for Rosecrans lost the initiative and was forced to concentrate his separated corps. Bragg, on the other hand, would try to bag Crittenden's XXI Corps next. Based on reports from his cavalry that Crittenden's force was scattered, and that there was a single division at Pea Vine Church, Bragg, order LTG Leonidas Polk, supported by MG W. H. T. Walker, northward. Polk, unwilling to attack, decided to go on the defensive and asked for reinforcements. Disgusted and frustrated by these failures, Bragg ordered his Army back to LaFayette.

After several days of inactivity, Bragg received word of Longstreet's impending arrival and devised a new battle plan. Believing that Crittenden's XXI Corps to be the northernmost Federal unit, Bragg ordered most of his forces to move northward on the east side of Chickamauga Creek and cross downstream above the Federals at Lee and Gordon's Mill. Bragg's intent was to turn the Federal left flank cutting them off from Chattanooga and to drive them southward into



McLemore's Cove. From north to south, BG Bushrod R. Johnson's Division ( a provisional division consisting of the brigades commanded by COL John Fulton, BG John Gregg, and BG Evander McNair) was to seize Reed's Bridge; MG W. H. T. Walker's Reserve Corps secure Alexander's Bridge; and MG Simon B. Buckner's Corps cross at Thedford's Ford. After completing the crossings, these units were to sweep southward cut the routes via McFarland and Rossville Gaps into Chattanooga, smash the Federal left, and drive the remainder of the forces southward into McLemore's Cove. While the flanking forces maneuvered to seize the crossing sites, Polk's Corps and Hill's Corps would fix the Federal Army from Lee and Gordon's Mill southward along the Chickamauga. The Confederate cavalry was to cover the Army's flanks with Forrest in the north and Wheeler in the south. Despite several false starts, delays, and contradictory orders, Bragg's plan was put in motion on the 18th.

### **Rosecrans Concentrates Northward**

On discovering that Bragg's army was not in flight toward Atlanta and recognizing the dangerous position his army was in, Rosecrans hastily began to concentrate his scattered units, moving them northward to cover Chattanooga. Because of the distances and the rough terrain, McCook's XX Corps was the slowest to move. Delayed by faulty information, inadequate reconnaissance, and the sheer difficulty of moving thousands of men and animals over 2,000-foot mountains, McCook did not join Thomas' XIV Corps in McLemore's Cove until 17 September. Together, the two corps then continued northward toward Crittenden's position around Lee and Gordon's Mill. Their route generally followed the west bank of West Chickamauga Creek, with Missionary Ridge on their left.

### **18 September, Preliminary Movements** (See Figure 4, page 9)

COL Robert Minty, (First Brigade, Second Division, Cavalry Corps), responsible for defending the lower Chickamauga crossing at Reed's Bridge, took up positions in Peavine Valley. He elected to defend forward of Reed's Bridge along the high ground several miles to the east overlooking Peavine Creek. BG Bushrod Johnson's column, supported by Forrest, some of his cavalry and Robertson's Brigade from Hood's Division, made initial contact with Minty's forward elements around 1000. Johnson responded by deploying his troops into line of battle for the push toward Reed's Bridge. Minty was forced back across Reed's Bridge, but continued to hold out until after 1430, and prevented Johnson's crossing until about 1600. While all this was going on, Hood arrived at Catoosa Station and Bragg, getting frustrated at the lack of success crossing to the west bank, ordered him forward to make something happen. Hood arrived too late to affect Johnson's crossing at Reed's Bridge, but proceeded to march the column southward along the Jay's Mill Road toward Lee and Gordon's Mill. They bivouacked in the forest east of the Viniard Field, northeast, and short of the LaFayette Road.

At about the same time, upstream at Alexander's Bridge, COL John T. Wilder's mounted infantrymen ripped up the flooring of the bridge, choosing to cover the approaches to the crossing by fire from the west side. When Walker's three brigades tried to cross in the face of Wilder's seven-shot Spencers and Eli Lilly's artillery they had little success, at the cost of over 100 casualties. Walker was forced to find an alternate crossing site downstream at Byrum's or



Lambert's Ford. After wading the creek, Walker advanced through the dense forest, outflanked Wilder's position, and forced his retirement westward toward the LaFayette Road. Walker stopped for the night in the vicinity of the Alexander House, ending up behind Hood and Johnson, north of what they believed to be the Federal left flank. Because they had not gained the LaFayette Road, they were not aware of Thomas' movement northward through the night to Kelly Field.

Rosecrans, unaware of specific Confederate dispositions, but alert to their movement and to the danger to his exposed northern flank, continued his concentration northward to protect his Army, its main line of communication and lifeline to Chattanooga, as well as, the gains of the campaign. Towards that end, he ordered Thomas' XIV Corps to make a night march, pass behind Crittenden and take up a position on Crittenden's left to cover the LaFayette Road, preserve the route to Chattanooga through McFarland's Gap, and put the Army within reach of Granger's Reserve Corps. Rosecrans also ordered McCook up to Crawfish Springs.

Thomas dropped Negley's Second Division off at Glasses Mill to guard the crossing south of Crawfish Springs, and proceeded northward past the Widow Glenn House to the LaFayette Road in the vicinity of the Kelly Farm with his other three divisions -- in order of march -- Baird, Brannan, and Reynolds. As Thomas marched through the night, only Minty and Wilder stood opposite the Confederates who now occupied the west bank of the Chickamauga.

To the north, COL Daniel McCook's Brigade of Granger's Reserve Corps, responding to Minty's earlier call for support, arrived near the junction of Reeds' Bridge Road and the road past Jay's Mill to late to support Minty. However, in the darkness, while attempting to regain Reed's Bridge, McCook's advance elements stumbled into stragglers from Johnson's column, capturing several prisoners. Rather than continuing on to the bridge in the darkness in unfamiliar terrain Minty, supported by COL John G. Mitchell's brigade of the Reserve Corps, formed a hasty defensive position for the night several hundred yards west of the intersection. While Minty went into position along the Reed's Bridge Road northwest of Jay's Mill Confederate cavalry (1st Georgia) moved into position south of the Jay's Mill - Brotherton Road intersection.

After interrogating the prisoners and identifying them as being from BG Evander McNair's Brigade Johnson's Division, McCook, believing that the bridge had been destroyed and that he had trapped a single Confederate brigade on the west side of the creek, sensed an opportunity to "bag" McNair's Brigade. Earlier the morning of the 19th McCook ordered the attached 69th Ohio forward to destroy the Reed's Bridge, which they failed to do. However, BG Henry Davidson's Confederate cavalrymen made contact with some of McCook's pickets and running engagement ensued. Also about that time MG Gordon Granger ordered McCook back to Rossville. As McCook withdrew early on the morning of the 19th he informed Thomas of the single Confederate brigade "trapped" on the west side of the creek. Thomas sent BG John Brannan's 3d Division eastward toward Reed's Bridge to develop the situation. One of Brannan's brigades (COL John B. Croxton's 2d Brigade) made contact with elements of BG Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry in the forest near Jay's Mill.




FIGURE 4: Movement to Contact, 18 to 19 September 1863



## **19 September, The Battle Opens at Jay's Mill** (See Figures 5, 6 and 7, pages 11, 12 and 14)

During the night, Forrest had been ordered to secure the Army's right and rear. His scouts, upon arriving at Jay's Mill, encountered Federal pickets. The scouts ran the Federals back to their lines then retired for the night, withdrawing south of the Jay's Mill Road. At dawn BG H. B. Davidson, commanding the troops on the scene, ordered the 1st Georgia forward and they found McCook's soldiers filling their canteens at the spring and brewing coffee. The Confederate cavalymen engaged and chased the Federals off pursuing them into the woods. The remainder of Davidson's Brigade followed. Forrest, after arriving, assessed the situation and ordered Davidson to recon further west.

This movement brought about the titanic struggle that developed into the two day "Battle of Chickamauga." For the rest of the day, both Army commanders funneled additional units northward trying to stabilize the front causing the battlelines to extend southward. Their efforts to influence and control the battle were ineffective because of the terrain and the rapidly developing momentum of the battle.

Davidson's troopers advancing once again into the woods in the vicinity of Jay's Mill, encountered COL John T. Croxton's Federal infantry brigade, it was about 0730, and were thrown back in panic and confusion. Momentarily stunned, Forrest, BG John Pegram, and Davidson rallied the confused Confederates forming them into line of battle west of the Jay field. Croxton, in response, discontinued his advance and deployed his five regiments and prepared to meet a renewed Confederate advance.

Forrest, upon seeing that he faced the infantry, rode off for reinforcements. Upon reaching MG William H.T. Walker, commander of the Reserve Corps, Forrest requested assistance and receiving Bragg's approval, Walker ordered COL Claudis C. Wilson to support Forrest. Wilson advanced his brigade and entered the battle, shortly after 0900, entering the battle on Davidson's left, Wilson forced Croxton to change front in order to meet this new threat. This movement generated some confusion, and the contact caused the Federals to give ground. Croxton managed to reestablish a subsequent line several hundred yards to the rear of his original position, but with his ammunition almost exhausted he called for relief.

Thomas next ordered BG Absalmon Baird to follow Brannan with the 1st Division. Baird's division was resting in line of battle in the south end of the Kelly Field after their long night march. Baird advanced with two brigades abreast and one in support. . The 1st Division marched westward with BG John H. King's 3d Brigade, the "Regular Brigade," on the left, COL Benjamin F. Scribner's 1st Brigade on the right, and BG John C. Starkweather's 2d Brigade in support. BG Benjamin F. Scribner (1st Brigade) came in on Croxton's right, while BG John H. King (3d Brigade) positioned himself to replace Croxton. This action drove off Wilson and permitted Croxton to withdraw in order to resupply. Scribner's Brigade flushed with the excitement of routing Wilson, had little time to bask in the glory of their achievement, because they were in danger of being enveloped by BG St. John Liddell's Division of Walker's Reserve Corps.




FIGURE 5: Opening Engagements, 0900, 19 September 1863




FIGURE 6: Jay's Mill, 0900 to 1100, 19 September 1863




Shortly before 1100, Bragg, listening to the sounds of the continuously developing battle, directed Walker to send BG St. John R. Liddell's Division forward. It was about 1130 when Liddell's units swept across the Brotherton Road and through the Winfrey Field. Liddell deployed with both his brigades on line, COL Daniel C. Govan's Arkansas and Louisiana troops on the left and BG Edward C. Walthall's Mississippians on the right. Scribner was hit on the right by Govan and on his left by Walthall. The retreat of Scribner's badly mauled units carried them back across the LaFayette Road before they rallied.

BG Absalom Baird's 2d Brigade, commanded by BG John C. Starkweather, advanced from the Kelly Field as the division reserve and were also victims of Liddell's steamroller. While enroute Starkweather moved left to relieve Croxton's brigade, but before he could change directions, Starkweather met Croxton's withdrawing unit. Next, Starkweather turned southeast in response to the sounds of the developing battle. As a result, Starkweather was hit while trying to reposition in the face of a charging enemy force. While trying to refuse his flank, his unit was hit on the right flank and front by COL Daniel C. Govan's Brigade of Liddell's Division. Starkweather's Brigade disintegrated and fled to the rear not rallying until west of the LaFayette Road. Both Starkweather's and Scribner's Brigades reentered the battle area later in the day to support BG Richard W. Johnson's Division (2d Division, XX Corps)

BG John H. King's Brigade, originally oriented to the direction COL Claudius C. Wilson had retired, but warned of a threat to his right flank, he tried to reorient to the southeast when he was hit by BG Edward C. Wathall's onrushing Mississippians of BG Liddell's Division. Vulnerable because they were in motion and not prepared to accept the attack on their flank, King's Brigade was also routed and fled to the rear. They could not be rallied until they had passed through and beyond Brannan's 3d Brigade (COL Ferdinand Van Derveer) out on Reed's Bridge Road.

Colonel Van Derveer, ordered by Brannan to advance along the Reed's Bridge Road chose to advance cautiously and slowly in line of battle. Van Derveer's Brigade had their hands full repulsing several attacks by COL George C. Dibrell's Cavalry Brigade and BG Matthew D. Ector's Brigade of infantry from Walker's Reserve Corps. Forrest deployed Dibrell's Brigade out on his right flank for security and as they advanced dismounted along the Reed's Bridge Road they were engaged by Van Derveer's brigade. To support Dibrell, Forrest grabbed Ector's Brigade from the Reserve Corps without MG Walker's knowledge. Neither of the Confederate units could budge Van Derveer from his defensive position (now reinforced by part of COL John M. Connell's 1st Brigade, 3d Division.)

Just as the fighting to their front died down, King's routed units came barreling through their position, chased by wildly cheering Confederates from Walthall's Brigade. The charging Confederates, in turn, were met unexpectedly by Van Derveer's men, supported by COL John M. Connell's 1st Brigade, 3d Division (Brannan) XIV Corps, who rose up from their prone positions to deliver a devastating wall of fire into the faces of the onrushing and unsuspecting Confederates. Walthall's exuberant charge was abruptly stopped, and the Mississippians were unceremoniously ejected from the fight. Also Govan's charge through the Federals was blunted by Croxton's return to the battlefield. Croxton's brigade drove Liddell's spent troops eastward



**FIGURE 7: Late Morning Engagements, 1000 to 1130 , 19 September 1863**



and back across the Winfrey Field. Croxton, after disposing of Govan, next fell on Walthall's exposed left flank, contributing to his ejection and withdrawal eastward across the Brotherton Road.

### **Cheatham's Attack -- Early Afternoon.** (See Figure 8, page 16)

By the time the Federals drove Walker back across the Brotherton Road, Brannan and Baird had rallied and reorganized, other units arrived to pick up the action and extend the battle southward. Later in the morning (1100) and into the early afternoon MG Benjamin F. Cheatham's Division of five brigades (Polk's Corps), arrived arrayed in line of battle from left to right, BG Marcus J. Wright, BG Preston Smith, and BG John K. Jackson with the brigades of BG George Maney and BG Otho F. Strahl in reserve, passed around Walker's left and advanced to the northwest. Jackson's Brigade encountered Croxton's brigade in the vicinity of the Winfrey Farm and after a short exchange overlapped and forced the weary Federals to retire from the field once again. However, the pursuit was cut short by the arrival of BG Richard Johnson's 2d Division, XX Corps (McCook) sent north at around 1000 from Crawfish Springs by Rosecrans to assist Thomas.

Jackson's Brigade now (1300) faced the fresh Federal brigade of BG August Willich (1st Brigade, 2d Division, XX Corps), both commanders decided to take up a hasty defense and exchange fire, while waiting for the other to charge. In the meantime Johnson's 3d Brigade, commanded by COL Philemon P. Baldwin, which had fallen behind Willich came into position on the left flank and threatened Jackson's right. To make matters worse for Jackson, Johnson's reserve brigade (COL Joseph B. Dodge), came up on Willich's right flank positioned to threaten his other flank. In addition, Jackson's troops, who had been in contact for over an hour, were burning up their available ammunition. Jackson needed relief. Cheatham committed Maney's Brigade to replace Jackson in line and Forrest deployed Dibrell's Brigade of cavalry, dismounted, out on Maney's right. Maney soon found himself facing envelopment by Johnson's division. The Federal line surged forward retaking the Winfrey Field, gathering a momentum of its own that neither Maney nor Dibrell could contain.

The initial success Cheatham achieved was short lived, as MG John M. Palmer's 2d Division, XXI Corps, joined the fracas on Johnson's right. Palmer, deployed in echelon on Rosecrans' advice, led with BG William B. Hazen's 2d Brigade on the left, BG Charles Cruft's 1st Brigade was next in line, while COL William Grose's 3d Brigade was on the left. When Palmer began his southeastward advance from the LaFayette Road, Hazen was on Willich's right, but veered off to the Brock Field, opening a gap between the two divisions, this gap was filled by Dodge's brigade. Hazen's movement contained the advance of Cheatham's center brigade, BG Preston Smith's. These two brigades, along with Cruft's fought across the Brock Field for the next couple of hours. Haze also engaged BG Otho F. Strahl's brigade, which replaced Smith's, before exhausting his ammunition and being relieved around 1500 by BG John B. Turchin's brigade of MG Joseph J. Reynolds' division, XIV Corps. Turchin deployed on Cruft's brigade's left and around 1600, in response to another Confederate push, they attacked into the Confederates flank. About 1700 they both withdrew to the Kelly Field. While all this was going on in the Brock




FIGURE 8: Cheatham's Attack, 1230 to 1600 , 19 September 1863



Field, Grose's Brigade tangled with Cheatham's left brigade, Wright. Overmatched, Cheatham was forced to fall back all across his front, losing all the ground gained previously. Part of BG Horatio P. Van Cleve's division (3d Division, XXI Corps), the brigades of BG Samuel Beatty, 1st Brigade, and COL George Dick, 3d Brigade, joined Palmer on Grose's right entering the woods just south and east of the Brotherton House taking up a line roughly parallel to the LaFayette Road and perpendicular to the Brotherton Road. Beatty's line encountered a Confederate artillery battery (Carnes) that had come into line on the extreme left of Wright's line and without infantry support. Catching them on the flank, the Federals administered a deadly enfilade fire on the stranded artillerists and forced Wright to retreat.


### **Stewart's Attack: Mid Afternoon** (See Figure 9, page 18)

Once again, the timely arrival of fresh Confederate troops recovered the situation. MG Alexander P. Stewart's Division of MG Simon B. Buckner's Corps pitched in south of Cheatham. Having been given vague instructions from Bragg, Stewart, on his own initiative, committed his division on a narrow front in a seam between Cheatham and Hood. About 1400, Stewart drew up his division into a column of brigades behind Strahl and after sizing up the situation directed his lead brigade, BG Henry D. Clayton, forward. Clayton, forewarned of the threat to his flanks changed his direction of march and thereby avoided the fate that befell Wright and Carnes. However, Clayton could not slug it out for long with Van Cleve's line (Beatty and Dick) which extended beyond his own and Grose's brigade, which attacked into his right rear. Stewart next ordered BG John C. Brown forward to relieve Clayton. Brown fought until his ammunition was exhausted, and was in turn replaced by BG William B. Bate's Brigade. By rotating his brigades sequentially into the fight, Stewart drove Van Cleve back across the LaFayette Road. The Federals momentarily resisted behind Reynold's gun line along the Brotherton Ridge before being driven westward. Clayton's brigade, having been rearmed, reentered the battle and penetrated into the Dyer Field. Stewart's drive westward threatened to split the Federal Army. However, he was unsupported and the Federals were able to rally and to bring pressure to bear on his exposed flanks, thus forcing him to retire back across the LaFayette Road. The approach of Reynolds and Brannan from the north threatened to pinch off the penetration and MG James S. Negley's division, racing northward, shifted the odds back in favor of the Federals.

### **Bushrod Johnson's Attack**

South of Stewart, the battle continued as BG Bushrod Johnson's Division attacked out of the woods and across the LaFayette Road, COL John S. Fulton's brigade on Johnson's right wheeled northward and attacked into the right flank of the Federals positioned on Brotherton Ridge, who were resisting Stewart's spirited attack. Stewart's and Johnson's attacks, though not coordinated, were complementary. Unfortunately for Johnson, additional Federal units continued pushing northward and COL Charles D. Harker's 3d Brigade, 1st Division, XXI Corps slammed into Johnson's exposed left flank. Harker engaged regiments from BG John Gregg's Brigade and Fulton's forcing them back across the LaFayette Road. Two regiments from Johnson's reserve brigade of BG Evander McNair, managed to pass through a gap that developed and shot out into the Glenn Field where they were abruptly stopped by enfilading fire on their southern flank





delivered by COL John T. Wilder's mounted infantry brigade and a section of 3-inch Ordnance Rifles from Eli Lilly's battery.

#### **Hood's Attack and the Viniard Farm Fighting** (See Figure 10, page 20)

In the woods and fields around the Viniard Farm, the battle continued into late afternoon, as MG John B. Hood's Corps mounted another threat to the vital LaFayette Road. BG Jefferson C. Davis' 1st Division, XX Corps, supported by parts of BG Thomas J. Wood's 1st and BG Horatio P. Van Cleve's 3d Division fought back and forth with Hood's old division, now under the command of BG E. McIver Law. Before the day ended seven Federal brigades from five divisions and five Confederate brigades from three divisions fought to a stand still. When driven back by the Confederates, the Federal units retreated and then rallied behind the tremendous firepower of Wilder's repeating rifles and artillery. Davis and Wood counterattacked several times against Hood's other two brigades, BG Jerome Robertson and BG Henry Benning.


As the sun set, the fighting wound down. The last of the exhausted Confederates were thrown back across the LaFayette Road after COL Luther Bradley's Brigade of MG Philip Sheridan's division appeared out of the south and entered the Viniard Field. In the north, Thomas consolidated his units, plus those that had become attached, in a defensive position around the Kelly Field. He kept Baird and Johnson forward as a covering force in the vicinity of the Winfrey Field. Elsewhere, the Federals pieced together the remainder of their north-south line along the LaFayette Road.

#### **Cleburne's Night Attack** (See Figure 11, page 21)

The Confederates, on the other hand, weren't finished. A division from LTG D. H. Hill's Corps, MG Patrick Cleburne's, sent north that afternoon was in position behind Walker's Reserve Corps opposite Johnson and Baird. It was at sunset that Cleburne surged forward supported by Smith's and Jackson's brigades of Cheatham's Division. In the darkness several attacking units became disoriented and missed their objectives completely. For those units in contact the fighting was fierce and confused. Two of Baird's brigades as they maneuvered to support Johnson fired into each other. Cleburne's right brigade of BG Lucius Polk found room to maneuver on the Federal left flank. Elements of Cleburne's left under BG James Deshler and Smith flanked the Federal right capturing two of Dodge's regiments. The pressure was too great for the Federals to hold and they fell back, followed closely by the pursuing Confederates. The darkness and increasing disorganization brought their pursuit to a halt and the fighting for the day to an end.

In the darkness, units bivouacked where they ended the day's fighting. During the night, the Army of the Cumberland prepared and improved their defensive positions. Thomas strengthened his position on the army's left with log breastworks, McCook withdrew slightly to refuse the army's right flank, and Crittenden assumed a reserve position behind the army's center. Within the Confederate lines, Bragg brought forward several divisions that had not been engaged and devised an offensive plan.










FIGURE 11: Cleburne's Night Attack, 1800 to 2000, 19 September 1863

This plan called for a coordinated attack, beginning on the Confederate right and rolling southward. Again, Bragg would attempt to flank the Federal army and drive it southward away from Chattanooga. Longstreet's arrival during the night permitted Bragg to reorganize his five infantry corps into two wings, with Longstreet commanding the Left Wing of six divisions and Polk the Right Wing of five divisions.

LTG Daniel H. Hill's Corps, now under Polk's Right Wing, was to begin the attack at sunrise. Unfortunately, a combination of poor staff work and the lack of initiative by senior commanders prevented Hill from learning of his critical mission until the day was well advanced.

While the Confederates tried to get their act together for the attack, the Federals continued to solidify their defenses. As Rosecrans and Thomas inspected their positions they found the key crossroads at the junction of the LaFayette and McFarland Gap roads were open. To cover the intersection, Thomas requested the return of MG James Negley's division. While waiting to be replaced in line, Negley sent his reserve brigade northward to Thomas.

### **20 September -- Breckinridge Opens the Fighting on the Confederate Right**

(See Figure 12, page 23)

When the Confederate attack finally began (0930) after several hours of delays due to faulty communication and coordination, one of Hill's divisions managed to maneuver around Thomas' flank and advanced several hundred yards into the Federal rear before being thrown back by the timely arrival of Federal reinforcements. MG John C. Breckinridge advanced his three brigades on line, BG Daniel Adams on the right, BG Marcellus Stovall in the center, and BG Benjamin H. Helm on the left. Helm's Brigade encountered the northern end of Thomas' breastworks defended by Scribner's and King's brigades of Baird's division and suffered heavy casualties. Breckinridge's remaining two brigades continued on relatively unmolested until they neared the LaFayette Road where they encountered several regiments from BG John Beatty's brigade of MG James Negley's division.

Beatty's brigade, having just arrived in position, was trying to extend Thomas' defensive line northward to cover the vital crossroads leading to McFarland's Gap and Rossville. Beatty's four regiments did not have time to prepare any defensive works. They were trying to hold a division front until the remainder of the division arrived, when struck by Breckinridge's Division. As Stovall and Adams brushed the thin line of defenders aside they turned the corner and headed south past the McDonald Farm.

Adam's Brigade, on the west side of the LaFayette Road, ran into COL Timothy Stanley's brigade of Negley's division and two of the regiments from Beatty that had been sent fleeing earlier and was in turn forced to retreat. Stovall, advancing on the east side of the LaFayette Road, penetrated the Kelly Field before encountering and being ejected by Van Derveer's brigade of Brannan's division, Willich's brigade of Johnson's division and parts of Grose's brigade of Palmer's division.




FIGURE 12: Situation 0900 to 1200, 20 September 1863



### **The Kelly Field Fight** (See Figure 13, page 25)

Breckinridge's success was unsupported, because LTG D. H. Hill ordered Walker's Reserve Corps to close a gap that had developed between Breckinridge and Pat Cleburne's Division, attacking to the south. Gist's Division (Walker's Corps) was ordered to support Helm's, who had gotten entangled earlier and he, too, suffered heavy casualties in front of Thomas' breastworks. Later Govan's Brigade of Liddell's Division attacked the Federal left, forced Van Derveer back, but in turn was run off by Grose, Willich, Stanley, and Barnes's brigades. Liddell's other brigade, Walthall's, attacked on Gist's left and was also repulsed.

Elsewhere, other units of the Confederate Right Wing, were having little success in front of Thomas' formidable breastworks. Cleburne's Division, futilely battered itself against Thomas' unyielding defenses. Cleburne's units experienced other problems as well just trying to get into position. Deshler's Brigade was pinched out by Stewart when he was shifted northward by Longstreet. S. A. M. Wood's Brigade got intermingled with elements from Stewart during their attack and got carried forward into the Poe Field. Cleburne and Stewart unsuccessfully attacked the fortified lines of Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, and Brannan. Cheatham's Division was pinched out totally. It would be late afternoon before they entered the battle.

### **Fighting in the Poe Field and the Attack of the "Grand Column"**(See Figure 14, page 27)

Stewart, although part of the Left Wing, attacked prematurely responding to Bragg's direct order, given in frustration, for everyone to attack. However, Longstreet withheld the rest of his units until about 1110. Just south of Stewart, along the Brotherton Road, Hood's Corps of three divisions, lined up in a column of divisions, awaited Longstreet's order to attack. On his direction this "Grand Column" swept forward and into history. The lead Confederate division was BG Bushrod Johnson's, with Fulton and McNair's brigades in the front line, Sugg (replaced the wounded Gregg) was in the second line. Next in line was Law's Division, Perry's Brigade, followed by Robertson's and Benning's brigades. In the last line was McLaws' Division (Kershaw) with the brigades of Humphreys and Kershaw. By chance, this column struck a section of the Federal line that had just been vacated and burst through to the Dyer Field.

### **A Gap is Opened in the Federal Center**

This was one of those moments when the course of a battle could turn drastically on the decision of the commander made in the heat of battle. The opening in the Federal line was the result of a complicated series of events and misperceptions that had been building all morning. Even before the action began on the Federal left, Thomas had been calling for reinforcements, and he continued to do so in the face of Confederate attacks. Both Rosecrans and Thomas ordered units from the army's center and right toward the left. As a result of these movements, Rosecrans came to believe that a gap existed in the Federal right-center, and he responded by ordering BG Thomas J. Wood's division, already in line, to move north to close the gap. Again, because of a combination of circumstances, there was actually no gap in the Federal line until




FIGURE 13: Kelly Field, 0900 to 1100, 20 September 1863



Wood's departure created one. McCook agreed to fill Wood's space, but Johnson's Division entered the gap before McCook could act, and the Federal line was irreparably split.

Although the initial Federal positions presented a strong defensive front with sufficient depth and tactical reserves, their right began to deteriorate early that morning as reinforcements were shifted left to Thomas. McCook, who commanded the Federal right, initially had the divisions of Negley, Davis, and Sheridan in line and his right flank refused and anchored on the Widow Glenn hill. Crittenden, his Corps reduced to two divisions, had Wood and Van Cleve centrally located between the two front-line Corps. However, Thomas asked for the return of Negley early that morning, and after some delay and confusion, Negley pulled out and was replaced by Wood. Wood deployed his three brigades on line, Barnes was on the left, Harker in the center, and Buell to the right. Rosecrans then ordered Crittenden to send Van Cleve to support Thomas, whereupon Crittenden asked to accompany his last division and he followed it northward. At this point, Rosecrans sent the fateful orders for Wood to close up and support Reynolds while McCook put Davis and Sheridan in motion. Harker and Barnes were already out of line and moving northward when Johnson struck. Johnson routed Buell, just pulling out of line, and forced Connell's brigade of Brannan's division, who was holding the left shoulder of the penetration, to retreat. The flood gates were open and the Confederate column of some 11,000 poured through.

### **Collapse of the Federal Center and Right**

On Johnson's left, MG T. C. Hindman's Division attacked on a two brigade front with his third brigade in reserve (BG Patton Anderson). BG Zach Deas' and BG Arthur Manigault's brigades, along with Anderson who had come up quickly, drove-off Davis' two brigades commanded by BG William P. Carlin and COL John Martin (replaced Hans Heg). Davis, with only two brigades, deployed Carlin forward and held Martin in reserve. Wood's move out of line left Davis isolated and vulnerable as he shifted Martin forward in order to try to fill the gap. When the massed Confederates struck, the Federal right quickly crumbled. Rosecrans, had a front row seat to view the ghastly events unfolding in front of him. He had moved his headquarters from the south end of the battlefield to a low ridge on the west side of the Dyer Field, just south of the Dyer Road and less than 2,000 yards behind Wood's and Davis' positions.

Next, Sheridan, ordered northward, further weakened the right and caused his units to be in motion when they were hit and overrun during the collapse of Davis' division. To make matters worse for Sheridan's command, his brigades were committed piecemeal trying to bolster the Federal line in the Dyer Field. Laiboldt was hit while moving across the Dyer Field in column of regiments trying to assist Davis' rapidly degenerating situation. Liaboldt's regiments were directly in the path of Davis' retreating troops as well as the charging Confederates. Although Laiboldt's brigade was quickly broken, BG William H. Lytle's brigade deployed along the south end of the same ridge as Rosecrans' headquarters. There they made a stand, momentarily, halting the advance of Deas' brigade. They fought off several assaults before their commander was killed and they were outflanked, then overrun. Lytle, himself, was hit three times, in the spine, foot, and mouth, and he was left on the battlefield when his brigade was driven off. COL Nathan Walworth formed his brigade in the woods, in an open area further south. Manigault's Brigade,





charging through the Glenn Field, quickly pushed Walworth back, but the Federals managed to rally long enough to allow Wilder's brigade to intervene by outflanking Manigault and delivering a devastating volume of fire that broke the Confederate charge and forced them to maneuver out of harms way by turning northward and into the Dyer Field.

### **Dyer Field**

Further to the north, the brigades of COL Cyrus Sugg, COL William Perry, and BG Jerome Robertson followed Johnson's path through the gap into Dyer Field turned northward and charged a Federal artillery position along the west side of the Dyer Field capturing the guns. Despite the attempts to rally fleeing soldiers and units to stand and fight the Dyer Field quickly became a scene of mass confusion and chaos. Command and control broke down on both sides.

By this time the Confederate units were disorganized and intermingled, unit integrity was practically nonexistent in some units. It was at this moment that Wood ordered Harker into the breach. He directed Harker to counterattack the disorganized Confederates in order to buy time for Federal troops rallying on Snodgrass Hill. In the face of Harkers counterattack, and caught off balance, the Confederates abandoned their booty and fled back to the east across the Dyer Field into the woods. It was at this time that MG Hood, while trying to rally these troops in the woods, was seriously wounded, a minie ball smashed into his thigh. Harker did not pursue, as Kershaw's Division of two brigades advanced in line of battle towards them. Harker's men were initially confused by the bluish color of the uniforms worn by the advancing Confederates. But Harker soon recognized that he was in danger of being outflanked and made an orderly withdrawal back to Snodgrass Hill. Kershaw did not immediately pursue but stopped to wait for Humphrey's brigade to catch up and support his right flank.

At approximately 1400, there was a lull in the action as some units continued to pursue fleeing Federals, others stopped to reorganize and rearm, while others rummaged through the large amount of Federal equipment discarded by panicked soldiers. Longstreet and Buckner had lunch while their commanders tried to regain control and sort out their individual units. Longstreet's Wing had been far more successful than they could have hoped or imagined, and Bragg's battle plan was overcome by events. The tactical situation dictated that the objective should be to cut off the fleeing Federal troops and the remnants that remained on the battlefield north of the penetration, which were the only Federal forces that stood in the way of a truly decisive victory. During the meal, a messenger from Bragg arrived recalling Longstreet to Bragg's headquarters to report on his progress. Longstreet rode off to Army headquarters, reported his situation and requested reinforcements, even though he still had not committed Preston's Division. Bragg refused the request, and refused to acknowledge the success already achieved and the opportunity that existed. He seemed to brood more over Polk's failure on the right. So, Longstreet returned to the Dyer Field about 1500 and ordered Preston forward.



### **Snodgrass Hill** (See Figures 15 & 16, pages 30 & 32)

Following the disintegration of the Federal right, Snodgrass Hill became a rallying point for many Federal units and individuals swept away from the Brotherton and Poe Fields. Forming part of the initial defense of Snodgrass were Sirwell's and parts of Stanley's brigades of Negley's division. Negley had accompanied Sirwell's brigade northward when a staff officer from Thomas ordered them to Snodgrass along with all the artillery they could gather in a vain attempt to cover the vital crossroads in the vicinity of the McDonald Farm by fire, a technique that had worked for them at Stones River. Portions of Connell's and Croxton's brigades of Brannan's division gathered there along with elements from Van Cleve's (Samuel Beatty) and Wood's (Harker and Buell) divisions. Later several units or portions of units from the Federal position around the Kelly Field would find their way there also (Hazen's brigade of Palmer's division and several regiments from Ed King's brigade of Reynold's division). These units threw up hasty breastworks along the crest of Snodgrass Hill and prepared to make a final stand. Snodgrass Hill is actually a part of Missionary Ridge, known as Horseshoe Ridge, consisting of three knobs numbered from east to west, Hill 1, 2, and 3. The Federals now held two distinctly different strong points on the battlefield separated by a quarter mile gap. Thomas, being the senior commander left on the field, tried to command both positions.

Kershaw's Division was the first to assault the Snodgrass defenses. After pushing Harker back, Kershaw advanced over a finger ridge jutting out of the base of Horseshoe Ridge then down into a ravine on the opposite side where his division was taken under fire by the Federal defenders on Snodgrass. Kershaw reoriented his brigade and Humphrey's for an assault that he hoped would blow the rattled defenders off of their pinnacle. However, the hill's steep slope and the defender's heavy volume of fire prevented them from reaching the crest. Kershaw would try at least three times to scale the heights and each time he was rejected. Next up was Anderson's Brigade of Hindman's Division. He, too, would be unsuccessful in his attempt to ascend the heights of Snodgrass. In the meantime, out on the Confederate left Bushrod Johnson maneuvered his three brigades into position past the Vittetoe House and up the western slope of Snodgrass. Johnson assaulted the hill in two lines, with Fulton's and Sugg's brigades in the forward line and McNair's in support. Just as Johnson's Division was about to occupy the crest of the hill they were met by fresh Federal units from MG Gordon Granger's Reserve Corps in the form of BG James Steedman's division. Steedman deployed his two brigades on line with Whitaker on the left and Mitchell on the right, driving Johnson back down the hill. Johnson coordinated his next attempt with two of Hindman's brigades on his left, Manigault and Deas, and the other, Anderson, on his right. This attempt also met with little success.

Back on the east side of Snodgrass, Van Derveer's Federal brigade arrived from the Kelly Field area. While on the Confederate side, BG Archibald Gracie's Brigade and COL John Kelly's Brigade of BG William Preston's Division relieved Kershaw's Brigade and Anderson's Brigade. About 1630, deployed in single line of battle extending from Knob 1 to Knob 2, Gracie's Brigade attacked Snodgrass Hill. Gracie's right engaged Stanley's brigade forcing them to fall back temporarily, but as the attackers began to run low on ammunition the Federals had recovered from their initial setback and counterattacked forcing Gracie's troops back down the hill. Gracie's left engaged the brigades of Harker and Hazen, advancing to within about 40 yards






FIGURE 15: Snodgrass Hill Actions, 1300 to 1430, 20 September 1863

before expending their ammunition. The engagement lasted for over an hour, Gracie's Brigade suffered losses of 90 killed, 608 wounded, and 27 missing -- 725 out of 2,003 -- 36 percent casualties.

Kelly also attacked in single line of battle, advancing between hills 2 and 3 against the Federal positions occupied by Van Derveer's and Whitaker's brigades. Advancing behind Kelly around sunset was Trigg's Brigade. Trigg maneuvered his three regiments around the left of Kelly's, up a ravine to the top of the hill, and in the growing darkness outflanked three Federal regiments, the 89th Ohio, 22d Michigan, and the 21st Ohio. These three regiments had been ordered to hold their positions, though running out of ammunition, with "cold steel if necessary." When Thomas was ordered to withdraw back to Chattanooga, he left Granger in charge of the Horseshoe Ridge (Snodgrass Hill) defenses while he went to supervise the withdrawal of Federal forces from Kelly Field. Granger, however, departed shortly thereafter leaving subordinate commanders to oversee individually, the withdrawal of their own units. By nightfall, Wood, Brannan, and Steedman had evacuated their commands. Left behind were the three regiments bagged by Trigg and Kelly.

### **Evacuation of the Kelly Field**

Over at the Kelly Field, Thomas had a plan for the evacuation of the units defending there. He withdrew units starting with Reynold's division in the southern end of that perimeter, then working northward sequentially. The Confederates, realizing that something was happening, renewed their pressure. Liddell's Division, Jackson's Brigade, and Polk's Brigade surged forward against the Federal lines that had withstood their most determined efforts since the fighting began in that area early that morning. Liddell advanced his division against the Federal left threatening to cut the Federal route of withdrawal, only to be routed and knocked back by Turchin's brigade (Reynolds), supported by E. King's brigade, as they charged up the LaFayette Road after pulling out of the Kelly Field. On Liddell's left, Jackson and Polk attacked, as Palmer, Johnson, and lastly Baird withdrew from behind their breastworks. The Confederate attacks caused some confusion, disorganizing the Federal withdrawal. However, the Confederate pursuit was not carried out very aggressively and Thomas successfully retired through Rossville.

### **Aftermath of the Battle**

In the days immediately following the battle, the Federals withdrew into Chattanooga and prepared to withstand a siege. Hampered by transportation weaknesses and crippled by massive casualties, Bragg's Army of Tennessee slowly followed and attempted to starve Rosecrans' army out of the city. Both armies had suffered heavily at Chickamauga with each army losing roughly a third of its combatants. Rosecrans had lost 16,170 killed, wounded, and missing out of about 62,000 engaged, while Bragg had suffered a total of 18,454 casualties out of approximately 67,000 engaged. Such losses meant that neither army could do much until the casualties in men and materiel had been replenished. While Bragg gained the remainder of Longstreet's command en route from Virginia and the exchanged prisoners from the Vicksburg campaign, the Army of the Cumberland received far more massive reinforcements from both the Army of the Potomac





and the Army of the Tennessee. Those Federal reinforcements would ultimately join the Army of the Cumberland in sweeping Bragg's army from Tennessee.

Because his victory at Chickmauga was not exploited in any meaningful way, Bragg's triumph was short-lived. As the last Confederate victory in the western theater, the battle served mainly to buy a little more time for the Southern cause. Federal troops in both Virginia and Mississippi were diverted from their primary missions to rescue the Army of the Cumberland, thereby affecting the timetable for Federal victory in those areas. Otherwise, the great expenditure of lives by both sides had little effect. Because they had left the field while others stayed, Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden all had their military careers blighted as a result of the battle. Nor did the victors, Bragg and Longstreet, gain much from their success. Honorably distinguished were George Thomas (thereafter known as the Rock of Chickamauga) and the thousands of soldiers who contended for their respective causes in the woods bordering the "River of Death" -- the largest battle in the western theater.

## CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, 1863

1863	EASTERN THEATER	WESTERN THEATER
JAN	Hooker Replaces Burnside	Stones River <b>VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN</b>
FEB		Period of Unsuccessful Attempts
MAR		OPERATIONS AGAINST PORT HUDSON
APR	<b>CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN</b>	Operations West of New Orleans
MAY	Chancellorsville	Grant Crosses the Mississippi Port Gibson Raymond Jackson Champion's Hill Siege Begins  Siege of Port Hudson Begins
JUN	<b>GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN</b> Lee Crosses the Potomac  Meade Replaces Hooker	<b>TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN</b>
JUL	Gettysburg Lee Recrosses the Potomac	Vicksburg Surrenders  Port Hudson Surrenders
AUG		<b>CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN</b>  <b>KNOXVILLE CAMPAIGN</b>
SEP	<b>OPERATIONS ALONG</b>	Bragg Evacuates Chattanooga  <b>CHICKAMAUGA</b>  Burnside Captures Knoxville
OCT	<b>ORANGE &amp; ALEXANDRIA RR</b> Lee Crosses the Rapidan  Confederates Retire	<b>CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN</b> Thomas Replaces Rosecrans  Supply Line Cleared
NOV	Lee Recrosses the Rapidan Mine Run	Orchard Knob Lookout Mountain Missionary Ridge  Longstreet to Knoxville Assault
DEC		Siege Raised

Figure 17

## SUMMARY OF CRITICAL EVENTS LEADING TO CHICKAMAUGA

**24 Apr 1862** - New Orleans captured by the Union Navy and by mid-summer only Vicksburg is left of the Confederate strongpoints along the Mississippi River.

**2 Jun 1862** - R. E. Lee takes command of the Army of Northern Virginia when Joe Johnston is wounded at Seven Oaks.

**Summer 1862** - Bragg invades Kentucky in conjunction with Lee's invasion of Maryland.

**8 Oct 1862** - Battle of Perryville, Kentucky (8,000 casualties) is an indecisive Union victory which causes Bragg to withdraw to eastern Tennessee. General Buell is replaced by General Rosecrans due to Buell's failure to pursue Bragg.

**31 Dec 1862 & 2 Jan 1863** - Battle of Murfreesboro (Stones River), Tennessee (23,000 casualties) is another indecisive Union victory.

**Dec-Jul 1863** - Grant's campaign for and siege of Vicksburg, Mississippi.

**4 Jul 1863** - Grant accepts the surrender of Vicksburg.

**23 Jul 1863** - Battle of Tullahoma, Tennessee, in which Rosecrans flanking movements force Bragg to withdraw to Chattanooga.

**16 Aug 1863** - Rosecrans begins his skillful deceptions and maneuvers which lead to his flanking Chattanooga from the west-southwest.

**6 Sep 1863** - Knoxville captured by Burnside, but he fails to advance and reinforce Rosecrans. McCook's corps at Winston's Gap, AL.

**8 Sep 1863** - Rosecrans orders Thomas' and McCook's corps to make separate crossings of Lookout Mountain and follow Bragg's retreating army. Each Corps carries 45 days of rations and ammunition for 2 battles.

**Sep 1863** - Bragg uses scouts, who purposely get captured, and local citizens to spread the rumor that his army is in head long fight.

**Sep 1863** - Bragg's cavalry of Forrest (right flank) and Wheeler (left flank) deprive Rosecrans of any information as to the location of Bragg's army.

**9 Sep 1863** - Rosecrans, using Crittenden's corps, occupies Chattanooga without a fight.



**9 Sep 1863** - Longstreet's 1st Corps with Hood's and McLaw's Divisions (9 Bdes & 6 Btrys of which 5 arrive in time for the battle) begin rail movement from Virginia. (Pickett's Division is left in Virginia.)

**9 Sep 1863** - Bragg begins receiving reinforcements from Johnston's Army of Mississippi. (Walker's Reserve Corps of 2 Divisions, Bushrod Johnson's Division and Breckinridge's Division.)

**9 Sep 1863** - Negley's division of Thomas' corps (Union center) begins passing through Stevens Gap of Lookout Mountain. McCook's corps begins moving through Winston's Gap 45 miles to the south and Crittenden's corps begins moving 15 miles to the north. Each corps becomes isolated and unable to mutually support each other.

**9 Sep 1863** - Bragg orders D.H. Hill's Corps to attack (night) Negley's isolated Division in the vicinity of McLemores Cove the following day. The attack is never carried out even though the Confederate outnumber the Union 33,000 to 10,000.

**11 Sep 1863** - Hill's and Buckner's Corps finally attack Negley's Division, vicinity Stevens Gap, but it is too late and Negley is able to withdraw to safety. Rosecrans believes the attack is a minor rear action by Bragg to cover his withdrawal.

**12 Sep 1863** - Bragg orders Polk's Corps to attack Crittenden in the north. Polk asks for more troops and misses the opportunity.

**12 Sep 1863** - Rosecrans orders a rapid consolidation of Thomas and McCook toward Crittenden in the north.

**13-17 Sep 1863** - Bragg's army is idle at LaFayette which allows Rosecrans to consolidate his army vicinity of Lee and Gordon's Mill.

**17 Sep 1863** - Bragg issues orders to move northward and cut Rosecrans off from Chattanooga - cancels movement - waits for arrival of troops from VA.

**18 Sep 1863** - Bragg intended to give battle, but is unable to get his forces into position.

**18 Sep 1863** - Forrest's cavalry and Johnson's Division capture Reed's and move to the west side of Chickamauga Creek. Walker's Reserve Corps of Walker's and Liddell's Divisions capture Alexander's Bridge, and also move west of Chickamauga Creek on the 18th.

**19 Sep 1863** - Bragg's reinforced army numbers approximately 67,000 versus approximately 62,000 for Rosecrans.

**19 Sep 1863** - Thomas orders Brannan's division to destroy a supposedly isolated brigade (McNair's of Johnson's Division) thus opening the Battle of Chickamauga.

**19 Sep 1863** - The end of the day's fighting finds neither side with a clear advantage and both armies basically facing each other along the LaFayette Road.

**19 Sep 1863** - Longstreet arrives on the field and Bragg divides his army into two wings, Longstreet on the left and Polk on the right. D. H. Hill, also a LTG, is placed subordinate to Polk, but is not informed of the change in command, nor does he receive attack order!

**20 Sep 1863** - Polk's attack is late (0945 hours) which is against Bragg's order to attack at daybreak.

**20 Sep 1863** - Stewart on Bragg's orders attacks Brannan (1100 hours).

**20 Sep 1863** - Rosecrans orders Wood's Division to (1100 hours) "close on Reynolds" which creates a hole in his lines.

**20 Sep 1863** - Longstreet attacks the Union right (1110 hours) center with B. Johnson's, Kershaw's, and Law's Divisions and routs the entire Union right, including Rosecrans from the battlefield.

**20 Sep 1863** - Thomas rallies the remainder of the army on Snodgrass Hill and with the timely arrival of Granger's Reserve Corps, is able to hold the line.

**20 Sep 1863** - Thomas withdraws the army to Chattanooga. The combined casualties for the two day battle total 34,624.

**23 Sep 1863** - Bragg advances directly on Chattanooga rather than crossing the Tennessee River and threatening Rosecrans' communication and supply lines. Bragg finds Rosecrans entrenched in the city and begins the Confederate siege.

## THE ARMIES AT CHICKAMAUGA

Major General William S. Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland was organized into four infantry corps and a cavalry corps (see figure 18, page 39). Eleven infantry divisions would see action at Chickamauga. Rosecrans' effective strength was over 80,000 men, but only 62,000 would be available for the battle; most of the Reserve Corps and several additional units were securing the army's lines of communication, which stretched to Nashville. Although some recently recruited green regiments were included, most of the Army of the Cumberland had considerable campaign and battle experience, with many units having fought at Shiloh, Perryville, and Stones River, as well as in many smaller skirmishes. Among these units was one Regular infantry brigade, comprised of battalions from the 15th, 16th, 18th, and 19th Infantry Regiments. Of Rosecrans' senior subordinates, George H. Thomas, a most capable and loyal Virginian, was clearly the best. He, Gordon Granger, and Alexander M. McCook (a member of

the famous "fighting McCook family") were West Point graduates, although McCook was a young and immature corps commander. Rosecrans' other corps commander, Thomas L. Crittenden, though a veteran of the Mexican War, was relatively inexperienced at corps command. David S. Stanley, an excellent cavalry corps commander, became ill in mid-campaign and was replaced just days prior to the battle by the ineffective Robert B. Mitchell. Although a few of his division commanders would prove inadequate, on the whole, Rosecrans was served by a better-than-average set of Civil War commanders.

On the Confederate side, General Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee grew to almost 60,000 men in the three weeks before the Battle of Chickamauga. Bragg's men were mainly veterans, though some regiments had no battle experience. Counting the reinforcements who would arrive by 20 September, Bragg's army contained eleven infantry divisions, organized initially into five corps. Bragg's senior subordinates were probably as capable as their Federal counterparts. Unfortunately, many had lost faith in their commander and tended to question many of his orders. Daniel H. Hill, Simon B. Buckner, William H. T. Walker, and John B. Hood were West Pointers, as was Episcopal Bishop Leonidas Polk. By the second day of battle, James Longstreet, a West Pointer with a strong reputation from service under Robert E. Lee in Virginia, joined Bragg along with 7,700 men. Joseph Wheeler and Nathan B. Forrest (the latter a particularly gifted soldier) commanded Bragg's two cavalry corps. The quality of some of Bragg's division commanders was exceptional: Alexander P. Stewart and Patrick R. Cleburne were among the best division commanders of the entire war.

Rosecrans' army staff was better organized than Bragg's. Although both men tended to handle too many details themselves, Rosecrans' logistical staff was more experienced, and he used his chief of staff, Brigadier General (later President) James A. Garfield, as an operational assistant during the battle. Bragg's headquarters was far more loosely run and employed lax procedures. Bragg also tended to use his staff more haphazardly, sending whoever seemed closest on liaison missions, including his chief of staff who never effectively coordinated staff activities. Much of Bragg's personal time was devoted to logistical details. Atrocious staff procedures in Leonidas Polk's corps headquarters contributed to the confusion and delays surrounding the initiation of the Confederate attack on 20 September.

Rosecrans' army was in excellent fighting trim. His delays after the Stones River and Tullahoma campaigns had allowed him to refit, and his soldiers had the high morale that only a series of victories can bring. In addition, he carried only four percent of his men on the sick rolls, a remarkable low figure for the Civil War. Morale and logistical support in Bragg's army could not match that of the Federals. Nevertheless, his soldiers possessed a stubborn pride born of adversity, and they were defending their home regions. In addition, Bragg's men knew of the coming reinforcements from Virginia.






Figure 18: Organization of the Army of the Cumberland, 31 August - 20 September 1863




Figure 19: Organization of the Army of Tennessee, 1 - 19 September 1863




Figure 20: Reorganization of the Army of Tennessee, 19 - 20 September 1863




Figure 21: Civil War Infantry Regiment Formed into Line of Battle

## **ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, U.S.A..**

**MG William S. Rosecrans**

(67,200)

4 Infantry Corps  
11 Infantry Divisions  
31/33 Infantry Brigades (4 Commanders killed and 3  
wounded)  
124/132 Infantry Regiments  
1 Cavalry Corps  
2 Cavalry Divisions  
5 Cavalry Brigades  
24 Cavalry Regiments

## **ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, C.S.A.**

**GEN. Braxton Bragg**

(67,300)

5 Infantry Corps  
11 Infantry Divisions (1 Cdr wounded)  
33/37 Infantry Brigades (4 Commanders killed and 5  
wounded)  
147/163 Infantry Regiments  
2 Cavalry Corps  
4 Cavalry Divisions  
9 Cavalry Brigades  
31 Cavalry Regiment

### **UNIT STRENGTHS**

	<b>UNION</b>	<b>CONFEDERATE</b>
COMPANY	25-40	25-40
REGIMENT	250-400	250-400
BRIGADE	1,000-1,500	1,500-1,800
DIVISION	2,500-4,000	5,000-6,000
CORPS	9,000-12,000	20,000



# **ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, U.S.A.**

**Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans**

## **Fourteenth Corps**

Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas

### **First Division**

Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird

1st Brigade: Col. Benjamin F. Scribner

2nd Brigade: Brig. Gen. John C. Starkweather

34d Brigade: Brig. Gen. John H. King

### **Second Division**

Maj. Gen. James S. Negley

1st Brigade: Brig. Gen. John Beatty

2nd Brigade: Col. Timothy R. Stanley (w);

Col. William L. Stoughton

3rd Brigade: Col. William Sirwell

### **Third Division**

Brig. Gen. John M. Brannan

1st Brigade: Col. John M. Connell

2nd Brigade: Col. John T. Croxton (w);

Col. William H. Hays

3rd Brigade: Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer

### **Fourth Division**

Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds

1st Brigade: Col. John T. Wilder

(mounted and detached)

Col. Milton S. Robinson

3rd Brigade: Brig. Gen. John T. Turchin

## **Second Division**

Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer

1st Brigade: Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft

2nd Brigade: Brig. Gen. William B. Hazen

3rd Brigade: Col. William Grose

## **Third Division**

Brig. Gen. Horatio H. P. Van Cleve

1st Brigade: Brig. Gen. Samuel Beatty

2nd Brigade: Col. George F. Dick

3rd Brigade: Col. Sidney M. Barnes

## **Reserve Corps**

Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger

## **First Division**

Brig. Gen. James B. Steedman

1st Brigade: Brig. Gen. Walter C. Whitaker

2nd Brigade: Col. John B. Mitchell

## **Detached Brigade**

Col. Daniel McCook

(c) captured (k) killed (w) wounded

## **CAVALRY, FEDERAL**

Brig. Gen. Robert H. Mitchell

### **First Division**

COL Edward M. McCook

### **1st Brigade**

COL Archibald P. Campbell

### **2nd Brigade**

COL Daniel M. Ray

**3rd Brigade**

COL Lucius D. Watkins

**Second Division**

Brig. Gen. George Crook

**1st Brigade**

COL Robert H. G. Minty

**2nd Brigade**

COL Eli Long

**Artillery**

CPT James H. Stokes

**ARMY OF TENNESSEE, C.S.A.**

**General Braxton Bragg**

**Right Wing**

Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk

**Polk's Corps**

Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk

**Cheatham's Division**

Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham

Jackson's Brigade: Brig. Gen. John K. Jackson

Maney's Brigade: Brig. Gen. George Maney

Smith's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Preston Smith (k);

Col. A. J. Vaughan, Jr.

Wright's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Marcus J. Wright

Strahl's Brigade: Brig. Gen. O. F. Strahl

**Hindman's Division (Assigned to Left Wing)**

**Hill's Corps**

Lt. Gen. Daniel H. Hill



### **Cleburne's Division**

Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne  
Wood's Brigade: Brig. Gen. S. A. M. Wood  
Polk's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Lucius E. Polk  
Deshler's Brigade: Brig. Gen. James Deshler (k);  
Col. Roger Q. Mills

### **Breckinridge's Division**

Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge  
  
Helm's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Benjamin H. Helm (k);  
Col. Joseph H. Lewis  
Adam's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Daniel W. Adams (w);  
Col. Randall Lee Gibson  
Stovall's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Marcellus A. Stovall

### **Walker's Reserve Corps**

Maj. Gen. W. H. T. Walker

### **Walker's Division**

Brig. Gen. States Rights Gist (20 Sep)  
Gist's Brigade: Col. P. H. Colquitt (k);  
Lt. Col. Leroy Napier  
Ector's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Matthew D. Ector  
Wilson's Brigade: Col. Cladius C. Wilson

### **Liddell's Division**

Brig. Gen. St. John R. Liddell  
Liddell's Brigade: Col. Daniel C. Govan  
Walthall's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Edward C. Walthall

### **Left Wing**

Lt. Gen. James Longstreet

### **Buckner's Corps**

Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner

### **Stewart's Division**

Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart  
Bate's Brigade: Brig. Gen. William B. Bate  
Clayton's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Henry D. Clayton  
Brown's Brigade: Brig. Gen. John C. Brown (w); Col. Edmund C. Cook

### **Cleburne's Division**

Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne  
Wood's Brigade: Brig. Gen. S. A. M. Wood  
Polk's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Lucius E. Polk  
Deshler's Brigade: Brig. Gen. James Deshler (k);  
Col. Roger Q. Mills

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Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge

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Col. Joseph H. Lewis  
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Liddell's Brigade: Col. Daniel C. Govan  
Walthall's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Edward C. Walthall

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Lt. Gen. James Longstreet

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Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner

### **Stewart's Division**

Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart  
Bate's Brigade: Brig. Gen. William B. Bate  
Clayton's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Henry D. Clayton  
Brown's Brigade: Brig. Gen. John C. Brown (w); Col. Edmund C. Cook

### **Preston's Division**

Brig. Gen. William Preston  
Gracie's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Archibald Gracie, Jr.  
Kelly's Brigade: Col. John H. Kelly  
Trigg's Brigade: Col. Robert C. Trigg

### **Hindman's Division**

(detached from Polk's Corps)  
Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman (w);  
Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson  
Anderson's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson; Col. J. H. Sharp  
Deas' Brigade: Brig. Gen. Zachariah C. Deas  
Manigault's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Arthur M. Manigault

### **Longstreet's Corps**

Maj. Gen. John B. Hood

### **McLaw's Division**

Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw  
Kershaw's Brigade: Brig.  
Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw  
(retained brigade command)  
Humphrey's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys

### **Johnson's Division**

Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson  
Johnson's Brigade: Col. John S. Fulton  
Gregg's Brigade: Brig. Gen. John Gregg (w);  
Col. Cyrus A. Sugg  
McNair's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Evander McNair (w);  
Col. David Coleman

### **Hood's Division**

Brig. Gen. E. McIver Law  
Law's Brigade: Col. James L. Sheffield  
Col. William F. Perry  
Robertson's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson  
Col. Van H. Manning  
Benning's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Henry L. Benning

(c) captured (k) killed (w) wounded



# CAVALRY, CONFEDERATE

## Wheeler's Corps

MG Joseph Wheeler

### Wharton's Division

BG John A. Wharton

### Martin's Division

BG William T. Martin

### First Brigade

COL C. C. Crews

### First Brigade

COL John T. Morgan

### Second Brigade

COL Thomas Harrison

### Second Brigade

COL A. A. Russell

## Forrest's Corps

BG Nathan B. Forrest

### Armstrong's Division

BG Frank C. Armstrong

### Pegram's Division

BG John Pegram

### Armstrong's Brigade

COL James T. Wheeler

### Davidson's Brigade

BG Henry B. Davidson

### Forrest's Brigade

COL George G. Dibrell

### Scott's Brigade

COL John S. Scott

## THE LEADERS

Because the organization, equipment, tactics, and training of the Confederate and Federal Armies were similar, the performance of units in battle often depended on the quality and performance of their individual leaders. General officers were appointed by their respective central governments. At the start of the war, most, but certainly not all, of the more senior officers had West Point or other military school experience. In 1861, Lincoln appointed 126 general officers, of which 82 were, or had been, professional officers. Jefferson Davis appointed 89, of which 44 had received professional training. The remainder were political appointees, but of these, only 16 Federal and seven Confederate generals had had no military experience.

Of the volunteer officers who comprised the bulk of the leadership for both armies, colonels (regimental commanders) were normally appointed by state governors. Other field grade officers were appointed by their states, although many were initially elected by their men. This long-established militia tradition, which seldom made military leadership and capability a primary consideration, was largely an extension of the states' rights philosophy and sustained political patronage in both the Union and the Confederacy.

Much has been made of the West Point backgrounds of the men who ultimately dominated the senior leadership positions of both armies, but the graduates of military colleges were not prepared by such institutions to command divisions, corps, or armies. Moreover, though many leaders had some combat experience from the Mexican War era, very few had experience above the company or battery level in the peacetime years prior to 1861. As a result, the war was not initially conducted at any level by "professional officers" in today's terminology. Leaders became more professional through experience and at the cost of thousands of lives. General William T. Sherman would later note that the war did not enter its "professional stage" until 1863.

## UNION AND CONFEDERATE GENERALS COMMANDING AT CHICKAMAUGA

### Army and Corps Commanders

- 5 of 14 - Had continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.
- 6 of 14 - Had limited active duty service prior to Civil War.
- 3 of 14 - Had no prior active duty service before the Civil War.
- 11 of 14 - Academy graduates.
- 10 of 14 - Fought in the Mexican War.
- 12 of 14 - Age 40 or older. (McCook 32, Wheeler 27)

## Division Commanders

### UNION

- 8 of 13 - Had continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.
- 3 of 13 - Had limited active duty service prior to Civil War.
- 2 of 13 - Had no prior active duty service before the Civil War.
- 8 of 13 - Academy graduates.
- 6 of 13 - Fought in the Mexican War.
- 6 of 13 - Age 40 or older. (McCook 30, Sheridan 32)
- 5 of 13 - Were from Kentucky.

### CONFEDERATE

- 3 of 15 - Had continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.
- 8 of 15 - Had limited active duty service prior to Civil War.
- 4 of 15 - Had no prior active duty service before the Civil War.
- 4 of 15 - Academy graduates. (Liddell Academy failure.)
- 6 of 15 - Fought in the Mexican War.
- 8 of 15 - Age 40 or older. (Armstrong 27, Pegram 31, Hood 32)
- 7 of 15 - Had been a lawyer, Congressman, or Senator.
- 7 of 15 - Were either from Kentucky or Tennessee

## UNION GENERALS

**Rosecrans, William Starke** - Age 44, Born 6 September 1819, Ohio.

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.

1842 U.S. Military Academy graduate (5th).

10 years in Engineer Corps, no combat experience.

Resigned commission in 1854 at the rank of 1LT.

1861 became aide to General McClellan.

BG (RA) Jun, 1861 - Bde Cdr, fights Lee at Rich Mt, WV.

Transferred to the Western Theater after the battle of Shiloh.

MG Sep, 1862 - Cdr, Army of the Cumberland.

Greatest military achievement was his brilliant maneuver to capture Chattanooga.

Chickamauga destroys his career.



**Thomas, George Henry** - Age 47, Born 31 July 1816, Virginia.

XIV Corps Cdr

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.

1840 U.S. Military Academy graduate (12th).

Artillery officer, fought against the Seminoles.

Brevetted CPT for gallantry during the Mexican War.

Fought on the Indian frontier prior to Civil War.

COL - Bde Cdr, Shenandoah Valley and First Manassas.

BG Aug, 1861 (volunteers) - Mills Springs, Shiloh.

MG Apr, 1862 (volunteers) - Perryville, Stone River, Murfreesboro.

**Baird, Absalom** - Age 39, Born 10 Aug 1824, Pennsylvania.

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.

1849 U.S. Military Academy graduate (9th).

Fought against Seminoles and along the Texas frontier.

BG Apr, 1862 - Div Cdr during all battles in TN.

**Negley, James Scott** - Age 36, Born 22 Dec 1826, Pennsylvania.

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.

Enlisted during Mexican War, active in local militia.

BG Feb, 1862 - Div Cdr, Murfreesboro.

MG Jan, 1863.

**Brannan, John Milton** - Age 44, Born 1 Jul 1819, Virginia.

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.

1841 U.S. Military Academy graduate.

Brevetted CPT for gallantry during the Mexican War.

BG Sep, 1861 - Div Cdr, Tullahoma.

**Reynolds, Joseph Jones** - Age 41, Born 4 Jan 1822, Kentucky.

14 years active duty service prior to Civil War.

1843 U.S. Military Academy graduate, resigned commission 1857.

Frontier duty in the Indian Territories.

BG Sep, 1862 - Commanded under Rosecrans, Cheat Mt.

MG Nov, 1862

**McCook, Alexander McDowell** - Age 32, Born 22 Apr 1831, Ohio

XX Corps Cdr

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.

1852 U.S. Military Academy graduate.

Limited duty along the Indian front.

Achieved highest rank of the 14 "Fighting McCooks."

BG Sep, 1861 (volunteers) - Div Cdr, Nashville, Shiloh, Corinth.

MG Jul, 1862 (volunteers) - Corps Cdr, Perryville, Murfreesboro.  
Partially blamed by Rosecrans for Chickamauga defeat.  
Although exonerated, he would never command again.

**Davis, Jefferson Columbus**, Age 35, Born 2 Mar 1828, Kentucky.

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.  
1848 commissioned directly into the Army.  
Enlisted during Mexican War.  
Father a career soldier and a Mexican War hero.  
BG Dec, 1861 - Div Cdr, Elkhorn, Corinth, Murfreesboro.

**Johnson, Richard W.** - Age 36, Born 27 Feb 1827, Kentucky.

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.  
1849 U.S. Military Academy graduate.  
BG, Oct 1861 - Div Cdr, Shiloh, Murfreesboro.

**Sheridan, Philip Henry** - Age 32, Born 6 Mar 1831, New York.

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.  
1853 U.S. Military Academy graduate.  
BG Sep, 1862 - Div Cdr, Perryville, Murfreesboro.  
MG Mar, 1863

**Crittenden, Thomas Leonidas** - Age 44, Born 15 May 1819, Kentucky.

XXI Corps Cdr  
Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.  
1840 admitted to the Kentucky Bar with a law degree.  
Father a U.S. Senator for Kentucky.  
Enlisted aide to General Zachary Taylor during the Mexican War.  
Personal friend of President Taylor and VP Breckinridge before the war.  
BG Sep, 1861 (volunteers) - Div Cdr, Shiloh.  
MG Jul, 1862 (volunteers) - Corps Cdr, Tullahoma.  
Blamed by Rosecrans for Chickamauga defeat.

**Wood, Thomas John** - Age 39, Born 25 Sep 1823, Kentucky.

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.  
1845 U.S. Military Academy graduate.  
Fought in Mexican War and along the Indian frontier.  
BG Oct, 1861 - Div Cdr, Shiloh, Perryville, Murfreesboro.  
Chickamauga does not hurt his career.

**Palmer, John McCauley** - Age 46, Born 13 Sep 1817, Kentucky.

No prior active duty service before the Civil War.

Lawyer, Congressman, Senator, and Governor from Kentucky.

BG Dec 1861 - Div Cdr, New Madrid, Corinth, Murfreesboro.

MG Mar, 1863.

**Van Cleve, Horatio Phillips** - Age 53, Born 23 Nov 1809, New Jersey.

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.

1831 Academy graduate, resigns commission 1836.

BG Mar, 1862 - Div Cdr, Murfreesboro.

His Division is destroyed at Chickamauga and he never commands troops again.

**Granger, Gordon** - Age 41, Born 6 Nov 1822, New York.

Reserve Corps Cdr

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.

1845 Academy graduate.

Brevetted CPT for gallantry during the Mexican War.

Fought along the Indian frontier until the Civil War.

COL - Bde Cdr, New Madrid, Island #10, Corinth.

BG Mar, 1862 (volunteers)

MG Sep, 1862 (volunteers)

He marched his Reserve Corps without orders to Thomas' aid on Horseshoe Ridge which helped save the Union army.

**Steedman, James Blair** - Age 46, Born 29 Jul 1817, Pennsylvania.

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.

Volunteer in Texan Army during Mexican War.

Private printer for U.S. Government.

Member of Ohio legislature, owner of Toledo Times.

BG Jul, 1862 - Bde Cdr, Perryville, Murfreesboro.

**McCook, Daniel, Jr.**, - Age 29, Born 22 Jul 1834, Ohio.

No active duty service prior to Civil War.

University of Alabama graduate, lawyer.

Chief of Staff Thomas' Division, Shiloh.

COL Jul, 1862 - Bde Cdr, Perryville, Murfreesboro.

Commands a detached Bde under Granger's Reserve Corps at Chickamauga.

**Mitchell, Robert Byington** - Age 40, Born 4 Apr 1823, Ohio.

Corps Cdr (Cavalry)

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.

Fought in the Mexican War.

Politically active in Kansas prior to the Civil War.



BG Apr, 1862 - Bde Cdr, Perryville.  
Chief of Cavalry for Thomas' Army of the Cumberland.

**McCook, Edward Moody** - Age 30, Born 15 Jun 1833, Ohio.

No prior active duty service before the Civil War.  
Lawyer by profession.  
LTC - Regimental Cdr, Shiloh.  
COL - Bde Cdr, Perryville.  
COL - Div Cdr, Army of the Cumberland, Cavalry.

**Crook, George** - Age 35, Born 8 Sep 1828, Ohio.

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.  
1852 U.S. Military Academy graduate.  
Frontier duty in California and Washington.  
BG Aug 1862 - Bde Cdr, South Mountain, Antietam.  
Brevetted to CPT for gallantry during the Mexican War.

## CONFEDERATE GENERALS

**Bragg, Braxton** - Age 46, Born 22 Mar 1817, North Carolina.

19 years of continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.  
1837 U.S. Military Academy graduate.  
Fought against the Seminoles and in the Mexican War.  
Resigned his commission in 1856 to run a plantation.  
BG Mar, 1861 - Commands the Gulf Coast defenses.  
MG Sep, 1861 - Corps Cdr, Shiloh.  
GEN. Apr 1862 - Cdr, Army of the Tennessee.

**Hill, Daniel Harvey** - Age 42, Born 12 Jul 1821, South Carolina.

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.  
1842 U.S. Military Academy graduate.  
Brevetted to CPT for gallantry during the Mexican War.  
Resigned his commission in 1849 to become a Professor of Mathematics at the Virginia Military Institute.  
BG Jul, 1861 - Cdr, 1st NC Inf., Big Bethel Church.  
MG Mar, 1862 - Div Cdr, Seven Pines, Seven Days,  
Second Manassas, Sharpsburg (Antietam).  
Cdr of the defense of Richmond at the time of Gettysburg.  
LTG Jul, 1863 - Transferred to the Army of the Tennessee.

**Breckinridge, John Cabell** - Age 42, Born 15 Jan 1821, Kentucky.

No active duty service prior to Civil War.

Lawyer, youngest Vice President of the United States from 1856-1860. (President Buchanan)

BG Nov, 1861.

MG Apr, 1862 - Div Cdr, Shiloh, Vicksburg, Murfreesboro .

**Cleburne, Patrick Ronayne** - Age 35, Born 17 Mar 1828, Ireland. (Had lived in U.S. since 1850.)

Limited active duty enlisted service in Britain.

Infantryman, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment.

BG Mar, 1862 - Bde Cdr, Shiloh.

MG Apr, 1862 - Div Cdr, Perryville, Murfreesboro.

**Longstreet, James** - Age 42, Born 8 Jan 1821, South Carolina.

Continuous active duty service prior to the Civil War.

1842 U.S. Military Academy graduate.

Brevetted CPT for gallantry during the Mexican War.

Fought in various Indian campaigns.

BG Jun, 1861 - First Manassas.

MG Oct, 1861 - Peninsular campaign, Second Manassas, Sharpsburg (Antietam).

LTG Oct, 1862 - Fredricksburg, Gettysburg.

Senior LTG in the Confederate Army.

**Hood, John Bell** - Age 32, Born 1 Jun 1831, Kentucky.

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.

1853 U.S. Military Academy graduate.

BG Mar, 1862 - Div Cdr, Sharpsburg, Fredricksburg, Gettysburg.

**Johnson, Bushrod Rust** - Age 45, Born 7 Oct 1817, Ohio.

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.

1840 U.S. Military Academy graduate, resigned commission 1847.

Fought Seminoles and in the Mexican War.

BG Jan, 1862 - Div Cdr, Fredricksburg, Gettysburg.

**Kershaw, Joseph Brevard** - Age 41, Born 5 Jan 1822, South Carolina.

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.

LT in the Mexican War.

Lawyer and Congressman from South Carolina.

BG Feb, 1862 - Participated in all 1st Corps' (Longstreet's) battles.

**Polk, Leonidas** - Age 57, Born 10 Apr 1806, North Carolina.

No active duty service prior to the promotion to MG at the outbreak of the Civil War.

1827 U.S. Military Academy graduate.

Resigns commission immediately to enter Episcopal Ministry.

Close personal friend of Jefferson Davis (Class of 1828).

MG Jun, 1861 - Cdr Dept. #1 (Mississippi River Defenses).

LTG Oct, 1862 - Corps Cdr, Shiloh, Perrysville, Murfreesboro.

**Cheatham, Benjamin Franklin** - Age 42, Born 20 Oct 1820, Tennessee.

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.

COL in the Mexican War.

BG Jul, 1861 - Bde Cdr, Shiloh.

MG Mar, 1862 - Div Cdr, Perryville, Murfreesboro.

**Hindman, Thomas Carmichael** - Age 35, Born 28 Jan 1828, Tennessee.

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.

2LT in the Mexican War.

Lawyer and Congressman from Arkansas 1858, 1860.

BG Sep 1861 - Cdr, Trans-Mississippi Department.

**Buckner, Simon Bolivar** - Age 40, Born 1 Apr 1823, Kentucky.

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.

1844 Academy graduate.

Brevetted CPT for gallantry during the Mexican War.

Resigns commission in 1855 for business venture in Chicago.

BG Sep, 1861 - Div Cdr during Bragg's invasion of Kentucky.

MG Mar, 1862 - Knoxville.

**Preston, William** - Age 46, Born 16 Oct 1816, Kentucky.

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.

LTC during the Mexican War.

Harvard law degree, Congressman and Senator.

BG Apr, 1862 - Div Cdr, Corinth, Murfreesboro.

**Stewart, Alexander Peter** - Age 41, Born 2 Oct 1816, Tennessee.

Limited active duty service prior to Civil War.

1842 Academy graduate, resigns commission in 1845.

BG Nov, 1861 - Bde Cdr during all battles in Tennessee.

MG Jun, 1863 - Div Cdr.



**Walker, William Henry Talbot** - Age 47, Born 26 Nov 1816, Georgia.

Reserves Corps Cdr

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.

1837 Academy graduate.

Suffered severe wounds while fighting Seminoles.

Brevetted CPT for gallantry during the Mexican War.

Severely wounded again during the Mexican War which would cause him continuous pain throughout his lifetime.

One of the most experienced officers in either army at the outbreak of the war.

BG May, 1861 - resigns commission Oct 1861 due to health problems.

BG May, 1863 - reinstated.

MG May, 1863 - Div Cdr, Vicksburg.

**Gist, States Rights** - Age 32, Born 3 Sep 1831, South Carolina.

No active duty service but involved in the state's militia.

Harvard law degree.

BG Mar, 1862 - Vicksburg.

**Liddell, St John Richardson** - Age 48, Born 6 Sep 1815, Mississippi.

No active duty service prior to Civil War.

Academy dropout after 1 year.

BG Jul, 1862, Corinth, Perryville, Murfreesboro.

**Forrest, Nathan Bedford** - Age 42, Born 13 Jul 1821, Tennessee.

No prior active duty service before promotion to

LTC at the outbreak of the Civil War.

No formal education but had acquired wealth from his plantation.

1861 he formed and equipped his own battalion of mounted troops.

LTC Oct, 1861 - Fort Donelson.

Regt Cdr, Shiloh, Bde Cdr, Murfreesboro.

BG Jul, 1862.

**Armstrong, Frank Crawford** - Age 27, Born 22 Nov 1835, Oklahoma Territory.

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.

Father a career soldier and Mexican War hero.

1854 commissioned directly into the active army.

BG Jan, 1863 (Cavalry).

Fought for the Union at First Manassas before switching to the Confederate side.

**Pegram, John** - Age 31, Born 24 Jan 1832, Virginia.

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.

1854 Academy graduate.

BG Nov 1862 - Bde Cdr, Murfreesboro. (Cavalry)

**Wheeler, Joseph** - Age 27, Born 10 Sep 1836, Georgia.

Continuous active duty service prior to Civil War.

1859 Academy graduate.

COL Sep 1861 - Regt Cdr, Shiloh.

BG, Oct 1862 - Chief of Cavalry, Army of the Mississippi.

He participate in nearly constant combat throughout the war.

During the war he was wounded 3 times, had 36 staff officers shot dead while they were standing next to him, and had 16 horses shot from underneath him.

**Wharton, John Austin** - Age 35, Born 3 Jul 1828, Tennessee.

No active duty service prior to Civil War.

Lawyer, Cdr, Texas Ranger Company.

COL - Regt Cdr, Shiloh.

BG Nov, 1862 - Bde Cdr, Murfreesboro.

**Martin, William Thompson** - Age 40, Born 25 Mar 1823, Kentucky.

No prior active duty service before the Civil War.

Lawyer, recruits his own cavalry 1861.

COL - Seven Days Battles, Sharpsburg.

BG Dec, 1862 - Div Cdr, Tullahoma.

#### Sources:

Generals in Blue. Ezra J. Warner, 1964.

Generals in Gray. Ezra J. Warner, 1959.

## CIVIL WAR STAFFS

In the Civil War, as today, the success of large military organizations often depended on the effectiveness of the commanders' staffs. Modern staff procedures have evolved only gradually with the increasing complexity of military operations. This evolution was far from complete in 1861, and throughout the war, commanders personally handled many vital staff functions, most notably operations and intelligence. The nature of American warfare up to the midnineteenth century had not yet clearly overwhelmed the capabilities of single commanders.

Civil War staffs were divided into a "general staff" and a "staff corps." This terminology, defined by Winfield Scott in 1855, differs from modern definitions of the terms. Listed below are the typical staff positions at any army level, although key functions are represented down to regimental level. Except for the chief of staff and aides-de-camp, who were considered personal staff and would often depart when a commander was reassigned, staffs mainly contained

representatives of the various bureaus, with logistical areas being best represented. Later in the war, some truly effective staffs began to emerge, but this was the result of the increased experience of the officers serving in those positions rather than a comprehensive development of standing staff procedures or guidelines.

### Typical Staffs

#### General Staff

Chief of staff  
Aides  
Assistant adjutant general  
Assistant inspector general

#### Staff Corps

Engineer  
Ordnance  
Quartermaster  
Subsistence  
Medical  
Pay  
Signal  
Provost marshal  
Chief of artillery

George B. McClellan, when he appointed his father-in-law as his chief of staff, was the first to officially use this title. Even though many senior commanders had a chief of staff, this position was not used in any uniform way and seldom did the man in this role achieve the central coordinating authority of the chief of staff in a modern headquarters. This position, along with most other staff positions, was used as an individual commander saw fit, making staff responsibilities somewhat different under each commander. This inadequate use of the chief of staff was among the most important shortcomings of staffs during the Civil War. An equally important weakness was the lack of any formal operations or intelligence staff. Liaison procedures were also ill-defined, and various staff officers or soldiers performed this function with little formal guidance. Miscommunication or lack of knowledge of friendly units proved *disastrous* time after time.



# WEAPONS AT CHICKAMAUGA

## SMALL ARMS

The variety of weapons available to both armies during the Civil War is reflected at Chickamauga. A 5 June 1863 inspection report from the Army of the Cumberland listed the following: 20,603 Springfields; 29,277 Enfields; 4,352 Austrian rifles; 2,033 Spencers; 1,031 smoothbores; 980 Austrian muskets; 725 Belgian muskets; 633 Henry and French rifles; 504 Colt revolving rifles; 327 Whitney rifles; and 54 Minie rifles. On the Confederate side, Lieutenant Colonel Hypolite Oladowski, chief of ordnance for the Army of Tennessee reported on 13 August 1863 that the following small arms were available: 10,500 Enfields (.577 caliber); 3,600 .58-caliber weapons (probably Springfields; 12,000 .69 caliber (mostly smoothbores); 2,000 .54 caliber (Mississippi and Austrian rifles); 3,000 .52/.53-caliber Hall rifles; and 900 .70-caliber Brunswick rifles, M1835/51, and Austrian Bokers. The remainder probably belonged to the Confederate cavalry and Oladowski reported those as Sharps, Maynard, Hall, and Smith models, as well as shotguns and musketoons.

The tremendous variety of weapons and calibers of ammunition required on the battlefield by each army presented enormous sustainment problems that ranged from production and procurement to supplying soldiers in the field. Amazingly, operations were seldom affected by the lack of ammunition, although the lack of standardization extended down to regimental level. For example, the table below shows the variety of weapons even within J. T. Wilder's brigade.

**Variety of Weapons in Wilder's Brigade**  
**30 September 1863**

<u>Regiment</u>	<u>Spencers</u>	<u>Enfields</u>	<u>Colts</u>	<u>Spring fields</u>	<u>Total</u>
92d Illinois	172	280			452
98th Illinois	354		9		363
123d Illinois	262				262
17th Indiana	454			2	456
72d Indiana	<u>127</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>      </u>	<u>38</u>	<u>208</u>
Total	1,369	323	9	40	1,741

## CIVIL WAR SMALL ARMS

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>MAX RANGE</u>	<u>EFF RANGE</u>	<u>RATE OF FIRE</u>
<b>INFANTRY:</b>			
<b>U.S. Rifled-Musket</b> muzzle-loaded, cal .58	1000 yds	200-500 yds	3 rds per min
<b>English Enfield</b> Rifled- Musket, muzzle-loaded, cal .577	1100 yds	200-500 yds	3 rds per min
<b>Spencer Carbine</b> seven-shot, magazine, breach-loaded, cal .52	800 yds	125-400 yds	8 rds per 20 sec
<b>Smooth-bore Musket</b> muzzle-loaded, cal .69	200 yds	50-100 yds	3 rds per min
<b>CAVALRY:</b>			
<b>Spencer Carbine</b> seven- shot magazine, breach-loaded, cal .52	800 yds	150-200 yds	8 rds per 20 sec
<b>Sharps Carbine</b> single-shot, breach-loaded, cal .52	800 yds	150-200 yds	9 rds per min
<b>Burnside Carbine</b> single-shot, breach-loaded, cal .54	800 yds	150-200 yds	9 rds per min

<b>Colt Revolver</b> six-shot, calibers .36 and .44	100 yds	20-50 yds
<b>Remington Revolver</b> six-shot, calibers .36 and .44	100 yds	20-50 yds

Basic ammunition load for infantry: 40 rounds in cartridge box. In addition, 100 rounds per man were held in the brigade or division trains and 100 rounds in the corps trains. When a large action was expected 20 additional rounds were issued to each soldier, who placed them in his uniform pockets or knapsack.

Wilder's Mounted Infantry: 60 rounds/person and 200 rounds in a nose bag on the saddle.

## **FIELD ARTILLERY**

The Army of the Cumberland at Chickamauga had 35 1/3 batteries of artillery assigned, but during the battle, two of those batteries were not present on the field. One was with Colonel P. Sidney Post's brigade guarding the trains, the other with Brigadier General George D. Wagner's brigade in Chattanooga. The 33 1/3 batteries that were available supported their respective brigades with about 201 tubes; of those, 103 were rifled and 98 were smoothbores. All the Federal batteries consisted of six guns except Battery I, 4th United States, with four; Battery M, 4th United States, with four; the 18th Indiana with ten, and the Chicago Board of Trade with seven.

The Army of Tennessee had 40 1/2 batteries of artillery, although the total number of tubes is more difficult to determine because of numerous missing and incomplete reports. Published estimates range from 200 pieces (which appears excessive) to 150 (which is definitely too low). Of the 150 guns that can be identified by type and model, only 32 were rifled and 118 were smoothbores. Most of the Confederate batteries were four-gun units except Slocumb's Louisiana with six, Martin's Georgia with six, Jeffress' Virginia with five, Robertson's Florida with six, Baxter's Tennessee with two, Culpepper's South Carolina with two.

The effectiveness of artillery of Chickamauga was limited because of the rugged terrain and the dense vegetation. Specifically, the Federals' advantage in numbers of longer-range rifled guns was negated by lack of good fields of fire. For the most part, batteries on both sides simply followed the brigades to which they were assigned. Certainly on 19 September, they spent most of their time moving, unlimbering, and limbering weapons. As the victors, the Confederates acquired the spoils of the battle, including the artillery. Rosecrans' report after the battle



acknowledged the loss of thirty-nine fieldpieces by the Army of the Cumberland. Because the captured guns were usually an improvement over their own pieces, many Confederate batteries incorporated the Federal weapons into their own commands shortly after the close of the battle.

### **Basic Ammunition Load** (half with guns, half in trains):

Napoleon	- 256 rds
Ordnance Rifle	- 400 rds

### **Artillery at Chickamauga:**

Union	- 201 (33 1/3 batteries)
Confederate	- 150-200 (est.) (40 1/2 batteries)

### **Artillery Ammunition:**

**SHOT** - Solid projectile.

**SHELL** - Fused, hollow projectile, with powder-filled cavity. Exploded into 3 to 5 large pieces. Commonly used at 500-1500 yards.

**SPHERICAL CASE** - Fused, hollow projectile, with powder and a number of small iron round-balls, that exploded in all directions. Commonly used at 500-1500 yards.

**CANISTER** - Tin, cylindrical can filled with 27 1 1/2 inch iron balls packed in sawdust. Can opened immediately upon exiting muzzle, showering enemy like large shotgun. Commonly used at 50-400 yards.

## CIVIL WAR ARTILLERY

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>MAX RANGE</u>	<u>EFF. RANGE</u>	<u>RATE OF FIRE</u>
<b>6-Pdr</b> Smooth-bore 3.67 in. bore	2000 yds	1500 yds	2 rds per min (4 with canister)
<b>12-Pdr How</b> Smooth-bore 4.62 in. bore	1000 yds		
<b>12-Pdr</b> Smooth-bore (Napoleon) 4.62 in. bore	2000 yds	1600 yds	2 rds per min (4 with canister)
<b>6-Pdr</b> James Rifled 3.8 in. bore	1700 yds		
<b>10-Pdr</b> Rifled (Parrott) or 3" Ordnance Rifle (Rodman) 3.00 in. bore	6200 yds	1850 yds	2 rds per min (4 with canister)
<b>3-inch</b> Rifled (Ordnance/Rodman) 3.00 in. bore	4000 yds	1830 yds	2 rds per min (3 with canister)

## TACTICS AT CHICKAMAUGA

By September 1863, Civil War battle tactics had evolved to the point that brigades were the basic maneuver units. Thus, both sides fought the Battle of Chickamauga by maneuvering brigades and attacking or defending along brigade lines of battle. Usually, a division commander controlled attacks made by two or more brigades under his command. This required tremendous coordination and synchronization, which the Civil War command system generally failed to provide. Further, the Chickamauga battlefield was heavily wooded, which made brigade and divisional maneuver even more difficult. Much of the tactical confusion at Chickamauga resulted from the difficulty of maneuvering large bodies of troops through difficult terrain with a command system that depended mainly on voice commands.

At Chickamauga, the armies exhibited basic differences in the way they employed their divisions and brigades. Confederate brigades most often advanced with all regiments on line simultaneously. Union brigades generally advanced with two regiments forward and two following in a second line. Use of these formations at Chickamauga usually meant that a Confederate brigade would overlap a Federal brigade of similar size, giving Confederate divisions the advantage of a wider front. There was less uniformity within each army at division level, but Union divisions tended to defend with two brigades forward and one brigade to the rear in support. Did these formations reflect evolving doctrinal ideas? Were they responses to the restrictive nature of the terrain? Did commanders choose these methods to improve their ability to control their units? Perhaps the answers lie in the personalities, experiences, and abilities of the commanders on both sides. Essentially, the Army of the Cumberland fought a defensive battle. Major General William S. Rosecrans concentrated his army as rapidly as possible in a position from which he could either resume the operational offensive or fall back on Chattanooga and develop a new campaign. On 18, 19, and 20 September, General Braxton Bragg intended to isolate Rosecrans from Chattanooga, but most of his attacks were frontal assaults against increasingly well-prepared and alert defenses. In the main, the battle devolved into a series of poorly coordinated brigade and division assaults. A notable exception was Breckenridge's divisional attack on the extreme left of Thomas' XIV Corps on the morning of the 20th. In this fight, two of Breckenridge's brigades, Adams' and Stovall's, reached the Union rear and were in position to cooperate with attacks against Thomas' front. The complications of coordinating this maneuver, however, defeated it as surely as the rifle-musket fire from Union reinforcements that rushed to the spot.

Merely turning Thomas' flank was not damaging enough to cause the Union line to crumble. Thomas' men stayed behind their fortifications, defeated Confederate attacks to their front, and let reinforcements turn back the threat to their flank and rear.

Lieutenant General James Longstreet's assault on 20 September, the stroke that routed Rosecrans' center, was a fluke. Longstreet's center, a column of three divisions organized in five lines, seems to have been more an adaptation to space than a conscious design. Although it was well organized and gallantly led, the grand column had the singular advantage of striking a



vacant stretch of Union line. Had that line been properly held, Longstreet's attack might have failed or, at best, achieved only local success at a heavy cost. As it was, the confused breakthrough once again demonstrated the difficulty of Civil War tactical maneuvers, even in a case where the enemy was broken and routed. Although the Confederates held a huge advantage for over an hour, they could not exploit it because the command and control to do so did not exist. Later, Longstreet's attacks against the Snodgrass Hill position were typical frontal assaults that were poorly coordinated and culminated in heavy losses.

At Chickamauga, both armies employed shortsighted tactics and seldom achieved long-range, coordinated objectives. A few units, however, profitably deviated from the norm. One Confederate unit, Major General Alexander P. Stewart's Division, effectively employed a unique battle drill. Stewart moved his brigades forward in a column of brigades, and when a brigade ran short of ammunition, he rotated another into its place. This had the effect of keeping a continuous pressure of firepower against the Union defenders, who fell back from Stewart's attack. Another unit that had great tactical success at Chickamauga was Union Colonel John T. Wilder's mounted infantry brigade. Its five mounted infantry regiments, mostly armed with Spencer repeating rifles, fought dismounted and were supported by an oversized battery of artillery (10 guns). In two important firefights, Wilder's brigade shattered Confederate infantry attacks. The firepower of the Spencers, coupled with that of the artillery battery, and the mobility of horses made Wilder's brigade unbeatable at Chickamauga. On the northern end of the battlefield, a Confederate unit, Major General Nathan B. Forrest's Cavalry Corps, employed tactics similar to Wilder's. Forrest's men also used horses for mobility and fought on foot as infantry. Although not armed with repeating rifles, they employed a more open formation in the advance, and they had good success on the northern flank at Chickamauga.

In sum, Chickamauga was like most other Civil War battles in terms of tactics. Attacks were piecemeal, frontal, and uncoordinated, and they generally failed to dislodge defenders. However, some tactical innovations, such as the rotation maneuver used by Stewart's Division and the open order employed by Forrest's cavalry, gave attackers a better chance of success. Employed defensively, Wilder's brigade clearly showed how integrating artillery and repeating rifles could dramatically influence battle. Unfortunately, these innovations were the exception rather than the rule. The same tactics that failed at Shiloh, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Murfreesboro failed again at Chickamauga.

## LOGISTICS AT CHICKAMAUGA

Supplies for Rosecrans' Chickamauga campaign flowed from Louisville (a base depot) to Nashville (an advanced depot) to temporary depots established near the Tennessee River at Stevenson and Tracy City. Bragg's supply system, however, was more politically complicated. Because Virginia could not produce enough food to sustain Robert E. Lee's army continuously, the Confederate government designated Georgia as the sustainment area for the Army of Northern Virginia, with Atlanta as the primary depot. This meant that Bragg could not draw

supplies from Atlanta even though it was barely 100 miles away. Although Bragg was ultimately allowed to use the Atlanta depot, such policies created bureaucratic headaches for Confederate Army commanders throughout the war. Bragg established advance depots along the Western and Atlantic Railroad at Resaca, Dalton, and Catoosa Station (near Ringgold) as the campaign progressed.

Once Rosecrans left his rail lines by crossing the Tennessee River, wagons became even more crucial. Major General Alexander M. McCook's XX Corps, which contained three divisions during the Chickamauga campaign, used over 850 wagons and ambulances pulled by over 4,700 mules and horses. These wagons, in addition to hauling routine daily supplies, tools, tentage, and personal baggage, initially carried three weeks' rations and enough ammunition to fight two major battles, as well as three days' forage for the animals (for a sample of logistical data, see table below). During movement, ammunition wagons received priority, followed by food, medical items, and other supplies. Sutlers (private businessmen selling "luxuries," who were precursors of the present-day post exchanges) followed these army wagons. Logisticians had learned early to push supplies as far forward as possible, so this train followed its units on the march and closed to within a few miles of the forward units when battle was imminent. At the start of the Battle of Chickamauga, the bulk of these trains moved to Chattanooga and relative safety, but ammunition wagons remained with the divisions.

### Sample of Federal Logistical Data

<u>Item</u>	<u>Packing</u>	<u>Weight (lbs.)</u>
<b>Bulk ammunition:</b> .58 Caliber, expanding ball 500-grain bullet)	1,000 rounds per case	98
<b>12-pound Napoleon</b> canister (14.8 lbs.)	8 rounds per box	161
<b>"Marching" ration</b> (per man per day): 1 lb. hard bread (hardtack) 3/4 lb. salt pork or 1/4 lb. fresh meat 1 oz. coffee, 3 oz. sugar and salt		2
<b>Forage</b> (per horse per day): 14 lbs. hay and 12 lbs. grain		26
<b>Personal equipment:</b> Includes rifle, bayonet, 60 rounds of ammunition, haversack, 3 days' rations, blanket, shelter half, canteen, personal items		50-60

Units at Chickamauga used two techniques of ammunition resupply during the battle. Either small groups of men were detailed to move back to the wagons to hand-carry the 98- to 135-pound boxes of ammunition forward or regiments withdrew to the ammunition wagons to refit. Artillery batteries usually sent empty caissons to the rear to replenish their stocks. Although no written doctrine existed on the subject, many units on both sides had established simple and remarkably effective methods to handle resupply operations. In any number of battle reports, descriptions of resupply techniques resemble some of the standard operating procedures that are taught in branch schools today.

## LOGISTIC ALLOWANCES

**The Soldier's Load:** About 46 lbs. (Union) - Musket and bayonet (14 lbs.), 60 rounds, 3-8 days rations, canteen, blanket or overcoat, shelter half, ground sheet, mess gear (cup, knife, fork, spoon, skillet), personal items (sewing kit, razor, letters, Bible, etc.). Confederate less, about 30 lbs.

**Official US Ration:** 20 oz. of fresh or salt beef or 2 oz. of pork or bacon, 18 oz. of flour or 20 of corn meal (bread in lieu if possible), 1.6 oz. of rice or .64 oz. of beans or 1.5 oz. of dried potatoes, 1.6 oz. of coffee or .24 oz. of tea, 2.4 oz. of sugar, .54 oz. of salt, .32 gill of vinegar.

**Union Marching Ration:** 16 oz. of "hardtack," 12 oz. salt pork or 4 oz. fresh meat, 1 oz. coffee, 3 oz. sugar and salt.

**Confederate Ration:** Basically the same, but with slightly more sugar and less meat, coffee, vinegar and salt, and seldom issued in full. For the Army of Northern Virginia usually half of meat issued and coffee available only when captured or exchanged through the lines for sugar and tobacco.

**Forage:** Each horse required 14 lbs. of hay and 12 of grain per day; mules needed the same amount of hay and 9 lbs. of grain. No other item was so bulky and difficult to transport.

**Union Annual Clothing Issue:** 2 caps, 1 hat, 2 dress coats, 3 pr. trousers, 3 flannel shirts, 3 flannel drawer, 4 pr. stockings and 4 pr. booties (high top shoes). Artillerymen and cavalrymen were issued jackets and boots instead of booties. Allowance = \$42.

**Confederate:** On paper the Confederate soldier was almost equally well clothed, but the QM was seldom able to supply the required items and soldiers wore whatever came to hand, the home-dyed butternut jackets and trousers being characteristic items. Shortages of shoes were a constant problem.

**Tents:** Sibley (teepee) held 20 men, feet to center pole, and was commonly used for permanent camps. "A" or "wedge" tent was stretched over a horizontal bar on two 6' upright posts, held 4-6



men. Also used mainly for permanent camps. For field use each soldier was issued a "Tente d'Abril" (shelter half), two soldiers buttoning their halves together to form a tent. Called "dog" tent by witty soldiers, now known as a pup tent.

**Baggage:** Enlisted men of both armies were required to carry their own. Union order of Sep 1862 limited officers to blankets, one small valise or carpetbag and an ordinary mess kit. Confederate standards allowed generals 80 lbs., field officers 65 lbs., and captains and subalterns 50 lbs.

**Wagons:** Union's standard 6-mule Army wagon could haul 4,000 lbs. on good roads in the best of conditions, but seldom exceeded 2,000 or with 4 mules, 1,800 lbs. at rate of 12-24 miles a day. Confederates used 4-mule wagon with smaller capacity.

## ENGINEERS AT CHICKAMAUGA

Engineers in neither the Army of the Cumberland nor the Army of Tennessee had a tactical role in the Battle of Chickamauga, although the Federal engineers performed essential missions in upgrading roads, railroads, and supply depots, as well as bridging the Tennessee River. Rosecrans' organic engineer assets included two special units: the 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics and the Pioneer Brigade. The former was a regiment of 1,000 men who were specially recruited for their engineering skills. The latter, formed at Rosecrans' direction, had men detailed from virtually every company in his army. In mid-September 1863, the Pioneer Brigade contained nearly 950 men. The technical expertise and construction talents of these men were supplemented by infantry detailed to perform manual labor, such as cutting trees and demolishing buildings for bridging material.

During the Chickamauga campaign, the 1st Michigan built a trestle bridge across the Tennessee River at Bridgeport that was used by two Federal divisions. The Pioneer Brigade was spread along the railway southward from Nashville, building bridges and fortifications as well as constructing platforms at the temporary depot at Stevenson, Alabama. A company from this brigade built the pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River at Caperton's Ferry. Although trained as infantry, neither unit was involved in combat during this campaign, although elements of the 1st Michigan had fought with distinction at Stones River ten months later.

Bragg's engineers consisted of four companies with a combined effective strength of just over 300 men. These companies, formed by details of infantrymen, were supervised by Bragg's chief engineer, Captain S. W. Presstman. Limited information about their activities exists, although one of the companies built and maintained a pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River at Chattanooga until Bragg evacuated the city in early September.

The engineer staff officers at the army headquarters of both armies created maps. The Army of the Cumberland had refined a portable photochemical process for reproducing maps in the

field and therefore created, updated, and distributed maps to at least brigade level. Federal maps depicted the gross terrain features, major roads, and existing town, including the location of various isolated houses, but at best, these maps were only general guides. As units moved through areas, commanders noted new roads and other features on their maps and forwarded that information to the army engineers so updated maps could be made and issued. Despite the Confederates' long-term control over the area, their maps were hardly more specific or more available than the Federal maps. Bragg's chief engineer was personally tasked with reconnaissance and mapping only after the army evacuated Chattanooga.

Ultimately, commanders on both sides used local citizens to provide additional information about local terrain. Longstreet's "living map" during the grand assault of 20 September was Thomas Brotherton, a soldier whose cabin was in the center of the line of attack. Rosecrans and some of his subordinate commanders also used local citizens -- the McDonalds, Dyers, and Glenns -- to provide information about the area during the battle.

## COMMUNICATIONS AT CHICKAMAUGA

The Chickamauga campaign presents, particularly from the Federal side, a view of the complexities of the early development and integration of different communications systems. The fixed telegraph system operated by the U.S. Military Telegraph Service provided strategic communications. Thus, army commanders could send and receive messages from Washington on the same day. The Army of the Cumberland's chief signal officer, Captain Jesse Merrill, expanded the capabilities of this fixed network by developing "trains" that carried over 200 miles of uninsulated wire and poles on wagons which could extend the telegraph lines to the advancing army. Using these assets, Merrill's trained civilian operators established a number of field stations east of the Tennessee River in early September 1863. On 17 September, Rosecrans orders Merrill to link the army's field headquarters with Chattanooga. By the morning of 19 September, Merrill had established stations at Crawfish Spring and the Widow Glenn's cabin, along the Dry Valley Road west of Thomas' headquarters, and at Major General Gordon Granger's Reserve Corps headquarters at Rossville.

The Signal Corps detachment of the Army of the Cumberland under Captain John C. Van Duzer, contained five field units with Beardslee devices. These "flying trains," operated by one officer and 16 men, carried some 400 slender poles and 10 miles of insulated telegraph wire on wagons. Although this system could not network directly with the Military Telegraph Service, it did link Thomas' and McCook's corps headquarters near Pond Spring on 17 September. This tactical communications capability remained unused during the actual battle, though some of the insulated wire helped Merrill's telegraph operation.

Both sides also used small signal corps detachments, which set up signal stations on Lookout Mountain and other high ground. These stations sent messages by flag (or lantern at night) as far as line-of-sight and weather conditions permitted. While the Confederates employed semaphore



techniques, the Federal signalers used Myer's wigwag system. Both sides used simple codes. The Federals used sets of two concentric rotating disks, one containing the groups of wigwag numbers and the second containing the letters of the alphabet. By prearranging the set of the wheels, the Federals could encode messages and change the set if necessary. This system proved secure, for no evidence exists that the Confederates broke the Federal codes. The Confederates used a sheet with rows of letters, not dissimilar to a page from a modern communications code book, and used prearranged code words to modify the encoding sequence. Confederate encoding procedures were often sloppy, and entries in Federal records show that this code was frequently broken. Although these signal systems were of some use in transmitting orders, they usually proved more helpful in providing information about enemy activities, because movements of both armies were often visible from suitable vantage points. Still, limited capabilities and the commander's lack of appreciation for telegraph and signal flag systems precluded any real influence on the battle itself.

The courier system, using mounted staff officers or detailed soldiers to deliver orders and messages, was the most viable tactical communications option short of commanders meeting face to face. Although often effective, this system was fraught with difficulties, as couriers were captured, killed, or delayed en route to their destinations; commanders misinterpreted or ignored messages; and situations changed by the time a message was delivered. The weaknesses of the courier system, though not critical in themselves, did tend to compound other errors or misjudgments during the campaign. For instance, Bragg, using courier, could not convince his subordinates to attack Major General James S. Negley's isolated division in McLemore's Cove on 10 September, and the young private sent to notify Lieutenant General Daniel H. Hill that he was to initiate the attack on the morning of 20 September could not locate that general in the dark woods. The Federals, too, had problems: information offered by one of Thomas' couriers prompted Rosecrans to issue (by courier) the order that moved Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood's division out of the line minutes before Longstreet's assault on 20 September.

The effectiveness of communications systems during the battle and campaign was hindered by the number of different systems employed, as well as the senior commanders' inexperience in utilizing the systems. The Federal Army had five different modes of communications: the existing civilian telegraph network, the extended lines provided by Merrill's military telegraph trains, the Signal Corps' "flying trains" (with Beardslee devices), the Signal corps' wigwag flag stations, and the numerous courier provided by each headquarters. Most of these systems were not compatible, thereby requiring a transfer of the form of message at each node. Moreover, most of the systems were under the control of different men, none of whom, including the army commander, fully understood the potential capabilities or problems of the overall system.



## MEDICAL SUPPORT AT CHICKAMAUGA

Although the Letterman system had been adopted by Grant's Army of the Tennessee by mid-1863, the Army of the Cumberland's medical system was then still in transition. In February 1863, medical Director Glover Perin, a veteran of sixteen years of Army medical service, had inherited an evacuation system in disarray. As an interim measure, he convinced Rosecrans to give quartermasters control of ambulances, but they were to respond to their respective medical directors or surgeons. This transitional system lasted until January 1864, when Perin finally was able to implement the Letterman system more fully.

The hospital system, however, corresponded with the Letterman model. General hospitals established at cities like Nashville, Memphis, Louisville, and Cincinnati made over 12,000 beds available for Rosecrans' army. In addition, Perin established interim general hospitals at Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Chattanooga, as the Chickamauga campaign progressed.

The Confederate medical structure for Bragg's army followed the standard pattern, except for its unique general hospital system. Surgeon Samuel Stout, Bragg's general hospital director, required general hospitals to be mobile. Thus, general hospitals established in Chattanooga and the surrounding towns evacuated and reestablished themselves closer to Atlanta in as little as seventy-two hours, as Bragg withdrew from Chattanooga. In a series of general hospitals established between Dalton and Marietta, Bragg's Medical Department had nearly 7,500 hospital beds.

During the Battle of Chickamauga, seven Federal division hospitals gathered around Crawfish Spring, two miles south of the battlefield, and one was established around the Cloud house just north of the battlefield. Two division hospitals were formed in the rear of the battle lines in Dyer Field and near Snodgrass Hill until enemy attacks forced them to displace rearward. On 20 September, as the Federal battle line collapsed, the hospitals at Crawfish Spring packed up and evacuated to Chattanooga, but were forced to leave about 2,500 seriously wounded and 52 surgeons to be captured by the Confederates. The Confederates used a mix of consolidated division and brigade hospitals, which were set up generally along Chickamauga Creek for most of the battle.

The greatest challenge for medical staffs occurred after the battle. The Confederates, already short of doctors and with medical supply stockage levels barely adequate for their own needs, had to treat large numbers of wounded Federal troops in addition to their own. The 2,500 Federal wounded captured at hospitals and the thousands of Federal wounded on the battlefield -- added to the almost 15,000 Confederate battle injuries -- initially overwhelmed the Confederate surgeons. It took the Confederates almost two weeks to finish policing the battlefield, and many soldiers lay for six to ten days before receiving any medical attention. On 30 September, the Confederates transferred 1,740 of the most seriously wounded Federals to Chattanooga under a flag of truce. The Federal challenge after the battle was less severe because of the smaller numbers of wounded under their control. Just over 4,000 Federal casualties initially made their

way or were brought to Chattanooga, where the surgeons made every effort to evacuate them to the safer hospitals across the river. By 23 September, only 800 of these wounded remained in medical facilities in Chattanooga.

### Casualties of the Battle

	<u>Federal</u>	<u>Confederate</u>
Killed	1,657	2,312
Wounded	9,756	14,674
Missing	<u>4,757</u>	<u>1,468</u>
Totals	16,170	18,454

### Army of the Cumberland

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>	<u>Total</u>
XIV Corps	665	3,561	1,888	6,114
XX Corps	423	2,699	1,235	4,357
XXI Corps	322	2,382	699	3,403
Reserve Corps	215	976	631	1,822
Cavalry	32	136	300	468

### Army of the Tennessee

Polk's Corps	431	3,066	198	3,745
Hill's Corps	370	2,448	171	2,989
Walker's Corps	341	1,949	733	3,023
Buckner's Corps	401	2,523	39	2,963
Johnson's Corps	298	1,038	145	1,391
Longstreet's Corps	213	1,773	42	2,088
Cavalry				250

## CHICKAMAUGA METEOROLOGICAL DATA

1. There had been no appreciable rainfall in the area of operation for approximately six weeks prior to the battle of 18 - 20 September 1863.
2. On 18 September, the sky was cloudy and the temperature at noon was 62 degrees.
3. The temperature dropped precipitously into the 30s during the night of 19 September, making the morning of 20 September very cold with a heavy frost.
4. On the morning of 20 September, a heavy fog covered the battle area, especially near Chickamauga Creek. The fog was enhanced by smoke from the burning woods. By midmorning, the fog had dissipated.
5. On 20 September, sunrise occurred at 0547, sunset at 1800, and EENT (end evening nautical twilight) at 1930.
6. The moon reached first quarter on 20 September and set at approximately midnight on that night.

## CHICKAMAUGA MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENTS

### Carson, William J.

**Rank and Organization:** Musician, Company E, 1st Battalion, 15th United States Infantry.

**Place and Date:** At Chickamauga, Georgia, 19 September 1863.

**Entered Service at:**

**Birth:** Washington County, Pennsylvania.

**Date of Issue:** 27 January 1894.

**Citation:** Most distinguished gallantry in battle.

### Meyers, George S.

**Rank and Organization:** Private, Company F, 101st Ohio Infantry.

**Place and Date:** At Chickamauga, Georgia, 19 September 1863.

**Entered Service at:**

**Birth:** Fairfield, Ohio

**Date of Issue:** 9 April 1894.

**Citation:** Myers saved the regimental colors by greatest personal devotion and bravery.



### **Reed, Axel H.**

**Rank and Organization:** Sergeant, Company , 2d Minnesota Infantry.

**Place and Date:** At Chickamauga, Georgia, September 1863; at Missionary Ridge, Tennessee, 25 November 1863.

**Entered Service at:**

**Birth:** Maine.

**Date of Issue:** 2 April 1898.

**Citation:** While in arrest at Chickamauga, Georgia, Reed left his place in the rear and voluntarily went to the line of battle, secured a rifle, and fought gallantly during the two-day battle; Reed was released from arrest in recognition of his bravery. At Missionary Ridge, he commanded his company and gallantly led it, being among the first to enter the enemy's works; he was severely wounded, losing an arm, but declined a discharge and remained in active service to the end of the war.

### **Richey, William E.**

**Rank and Organization:** Corporal, Company A, 15th Ohio Infantry.

**Place and Date:** At Chickamauga, Georgia, 19 September 1863.

**Entered Service at:**

**Birth:** Athens County, Ohio.

**Date of Issue:** 9 November 1893.

**Citation:** While on the extreme front, between the lines of the combatants, Richey single-handedly captured a Confederate major who was armed and mounted.

### **Chamberlain, Orville T.**

**Rank and Organization:** Second Lieutenant, Company G, 74th Indiana Infantry.

**Place and Date:** At Chickamauga, Georgia, 20 September 1863.

**Entered Service at:**

**Birth:** Kusciusko County, Indiana.

**Date of Issue:** 11 March 1896

**Citation:** While exposed to a galling fire, Chamberlain went in search of another regiment, found its location, procured ammunition from the men thereof, and returned with the ammunition to his own company.

### **Cilley, Clinton A.**

**Rank and Organization:** Captain, Company C, 2d Minnesota Infantry.

**Place and Date:** At Chickamauga, Georgia, 20 September 1863.

**Entered Service at:** Farmington, New Hampshire.

**Birth:** Rockingham County, New Hampshire.

**Date of Issue:** 12 June 1895.

**Citation:** Cilley seized the colors of a retreating regiment and led it into the thick of the attack.

## **Porter, Horace**

**Rank and Organization:** Captain, Ordnance Department, United States Army.

**Place and Date:** At Chickamauga, Georgia, 20 September 1863.

**Entered Service at:** Pennsylvania

**Birth:** Pennsylvania.

**Date of Issue:** 8 July 1902.

**Citation:** While acting as a volunteer aide at a critical moment when the lines were broken, Porter rallied enough fugitives to hold the ground under heavy fire long enough to effect the escape of wagon trains and batteries.

## **Taylor, Anthony**

**Rank and Organization:** First Lieutenant, Company A, 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry.

**Place and Date:** At Chickamauga, Georgia, 20 September 1863.

**Entered Service at:**

**Birth:** Burlington, New Jersey.

**Date of Issue:** 4 December 1893.

**Citation:** Taylor held out to the last with a small force against the advance of superior numbers of the enemy.

## **Whitney, William G.**

**Rank and Organization:** Sergeant, Company B, 11th Michigan Infantry.

**Place and Date:** At Chickamauga, Georgia, 20 September 1863.

**Entered Service at:**

**Birth:** Allen, Michigan

**Date of Issue:** 21 October 1895.

**Citation:** As the enemy was about to charge, Whitney went outside the temporary Union works among the dead and wounded enemy soldiers, and, at great exposure to himself, cut off and removed their cartridge boxes, bringing them within the Union lines. The ammunition was then used with good effect in again repulsing the attack.

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